A response to my article (“Invite ‘will-bes,’ not has-beens,” Aug. 12, page 8) mischaracterizes my arguments, as well as a speech by former British prime minister Boris Johnson at the Ketagalan Forum in Taipei early last month.
Tseng Yueh-ying (曾月英) in the response (“A misreading of Johnson’s speech,” Aug. 24, page 8) does not dispute that Johnson referred repeatedly to Taiwan as “a segment of the Chinese population,” but asserts that the phrase challenged Beijing by questioning whether parts of “the Chinese population” could be “differently Chinese.”
This is essentially a confirmation of Beijing’s “one country, two systems” formulation, which says that Taiwan is part of “the Chinese population,” just following a different system.
Johnson’s phrase eerily echoes Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) “two sides, one family” slogan, rejected by the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese, who do not see themselves as Chinese.
The author said that I twisted Johnson’s statement claiming a majority of Taiwanese “do not want to declare they are a sovereign state independent of Beijing.” Johnson’s unnuanced statement speaks for itself, flying in the face of the nearly 90 percent of Taiwanese who agree that the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) is a sovereign, independent state not subordinate to Beijing.
The disagreement within Taiwanese society is over the name and future of the country, not whether it is independent of Beijing’s control. The consensus view in Taiwan, and the objective reality, is that the ROC and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are not subordinate to each other.
Tseng wrote that Johnson’s call for Taiwan to increase investment in China “was not a suggestion for future policy, but a factual observation.” This is completely false, his mention of Taiwan investing massively in China came as part of a suggestion to ask Beijing whether they “really want Taiwan,” with no mention of “Taiwan’s willingness to build bridges, and demonstrate its economic strength and goodwill.”
Tseng’s claim that Taiwan wants to build more economic bridges with China belies massive public opposition against increased economic ties, exemplified by the Sunflower and Bluebird movements, in which Taiwanese mobilized to stop legislation that they feared would subjugate Taiwan’s economy to China’s.
My article never stated that Johnson’s speech was generated by artificial intelligence, merely that Johnson implied he wrote his rambling speech with help from ChatGPT. Tseng also denied that Johnson, who built his career on hostility to migration, denigrated migrant caregivers when he said robots were preferable to immigrants in caring for elderly people.
Tseng sees Johnson as a well-regarded statesman who will elevate Taiwan on the world stage, the same line of thinking that led the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to write him a large check.
However, Johnson is simply no longer a “key voice in domestic and international political discourse,” and it is an open secret among the foreign diplomatic corps in Taipei, particularly Europeans, that Johnson’s visit was alienating and viewed with derision. This embarrassment became particularly obvious when Johnson used a joint news conference with President William Lai (賴清德) to bash the British government.
A recent column in The Diplomat by British academic Max Dixon noted that Johnson’s visit underscored the UK’s growing regard for Taiwan, observing that Johnson retains some support within the Conservative Party.
Notwithstanding current dissatisfaction with the Labour government, a general election is unlikely before 2029 and momentum is surging not to the Conservatives, but to Reform UK, animated by immigration concerns. Despite having campaigned for Brexit and the premiership on the issue, Johnson is viewed by Reform supporters as a turncoat, having presided over the largest influx of immigration in decades. If Johnson’s own supporters no longer trust him, how can Taiwan?
Tseng wrongly said that I question the ethics of paying exorbitant speaking fees, given the reported ￡100,000 (US$134,110) honorarium paid for his two-day visit. I question not the ethics, but the utility: What good is ￡100,000 to someone who also received ￡250,000 from mysterious China-based entities? If Taiwan’s international support rides on the size of its checkbook, then it needs to spend more smartly. A spent force who once described himself as a “fervent Sinophile” and greenlit the sale of the UK’s largest semiconductor fab to China is not a sound investment.
China recently announced that it would cut ties with Taiwan-friendly Czech President Petr Pavel over his meeting in India with the Dalai Lama. Pavel, who has stood up on his morals rather than waiting until retirement to find them, retains strong public support, despite China’s backlash. Perhaps what Taiwan needs is fewer checks and more Czechs.
Sasha B. Chhabra is a visiting fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taipei.
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