The much-anticipated 2025 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit, scheduled to take place in New Delhi later this year, has faced a setback, with US President Donald Trump reportedly to skip the meeting amid heightened India-US tariff tensions. Trump’s recent statements have raised alarms in India about the US’ trustworthiness, prompting New Delhi to adopt a damage control approach.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin, China. However, mindful of not being played by Beijing or sending the wrong signals, he avoided China’s “Victory Day” military parade on Wednesday. He also made a stand-alone trip to Japan, a key Quad member, for the first time in seven years. During his visit, Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba decided to scale up their technological and economic cooperation, and discussed ways to control the damage done by Trump’s tariffs.
Last week, Japan canceled a ministerial-level trade talk with the US. Before canceling the trade minister’s visit, Tokyo also canceled the annual 2+2 talks with the US after the Trump administration requested that it raise its defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP, higher than the US’ earlier request of 3 percent. In March, Ishiba asserted that Japan would decide its defense budget on its terms and requirements. The cancelation of the 2+2 talks and the difficult trade negotiations over tariffs have compounded the bilateral tension between the two allies.
The Pentagon recently launched a review of the AUKUS deal, which aims to equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines and promises up to five US Virginia-class submarines until Australia develops its submarines in partnership with the UK. The move has made Australia anxious, as the review might lead to the downsizing or abandonment of the deal. Seasoned Australian policymakers, such as Gareth Evans, have already begun voicing their concerns regarding the agreement.
With India, Trump’s tendency to be a dealmaker has caused bilateral tensions. Trump has repeatedly claimed that he brokered a ceasefire between India and Pakistan in May following clashes between the countries by leveraging trade pressure, which India has formally denied.
Moreover, the US’ public engagement with the Pakistani military, such as Trump’s lunch with Pakistani Army Chief General Asim Munir, has irked India. The Trump administration’s re-hyphenation of India and Pakistan has led to bilateral tensions between India and the US.
Clearly, the Quad is in a quandary. It was during the Trump 1.0 administration that the Quad was revived in 2017. Over the past eight years, the Quad has made substantive progress. The foreign ministers’ July meeting in Washington underscored significant strides in the Quad’s agenda and sustained commitment to four priority areas: maritime and transnational security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technology, and humanitarian assistance and emergency response.
The Quad is actively conducting various activities to bring its vision to fruition. From the first-ever Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission to address unlawful maritime activities in the Indo-Pacific, to the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, the Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific workshop, and the Maritime Legal Dialogue, the Quad has moved multilateral cooperation to great heights.
The Quad’s resolute disapproval of the bellicose diplomatic and military approach in the South and East China seas, the Critical Minerals Initiative to reduce over-reliance on China for the supply of critical minerals, and focus on protecting a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific have established it as a security provider in the region.
However, Trump’s penchant for throwing surprises in dealing with member countries risks derailing the Quad’s progress. While the three other members of the group have enhanced their security and economic partnerships, Trump has been taking steps that might jeopardize the Quad’s unity and shared goals,
If not addressed skillfully, Trump’s unpredictable diplomatic moves could derail the Quad’s positive trajectory. Therefore, it is crucial to “Trump-proof” the Quad.
A more systematic institutionalization of the Quad could safeguard the grouping from the challenges thrown up by leaders and the dynamics of any member country. Such institutionalization, particularly at the ministerial and senior official levels, would also lead to greater coordination among member states.
It could be beneficial in picking low-hanging fruit, such as the rapid implementation of already announced and non-controversial projects.
Currently, the Quad is viewed as a flexible arrangement of like-minded democracies in the Indo-Pacific, which is insufficient to deter China militarily. Institutionalization would lead to greater policy coordination and more actionable outcomes at the ground level. Additionally, greater institutionalization could also lead to increased efficiency in the functioning of the Quad, as it would facilitate seamless policy coordination in a time-bound manner.
That said, considering the way Trump has been overshadowing his officials, such a task needs a more coordinated and collaborative approach from Tokyo, Canberra and New Delhi. Only when those three members are united in their strategies and demonstrate resolve in driving the Quad forward would the grouping be able to overcome the “personality factor.”
Rahul Mishra is an associate professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies of the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, and a senior research fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance at Thammasat University in Thailand. Harshit Prajapati is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies.
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