Under Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, Manila has asserted its territorial sovereignty with a steady, unflinching stance in its dealings with China. From advancing defense and security cooperation with like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific region to strengthening its defense capabilities, Manila is not yielding in protecting its sovereignty.
Marcos’ visit to India, and more decisive engagements with Japan, Australia and France demonstrate Manila’s multifaceted approach to dealing with China’s bellicose postures. A key focus of Marcos’ India visit was on deepening economic and defense ties, complemented by a joint naval exercise in the South China Sea. While the exercise was not explicitly targeted at China, its timing and purpose were strategic.
Before that, the Philippines conducted a joint exercise with France, a significant naval power in the Indo-Pacific region. It signals Manila’s growing convergence with other regional powers on security, even as it maintains an independent stance. Such exercises are crucial for improving interoperability and sending a clear signal of partnership, particularly in the maritime domain.
They also highlight Manila’s understanding that being prepared, working closely with partners and maintaining a visible presence are key to deterring potential threats in a volatile maritime environment.
However, the South China Sea is just a part of the story. Taiwan is another potential flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific.
During an interview in New Delhi, Marcos acknowledged that the Philippines would inevitably be drawn into any conflict over Taiwan, citing both geographical proximity and the large number of Filipinos living in the nation.
As expected, China protested, accusing the Philippines of “playing with fire,” but Beijing, as is often the case, misrepresented his remarks. Marcos was not claiming that the Philippines would automatically take sides; he was recognizing the realities of geography, and Manila’s strategic, economic and diaspora interests.
China interprets any reference to Taiwan by foreign leaders as an attempt to expand the latter’s international space, revealing both Beijing’s strategic apprehension and its concern over Taiwan’s growing diplomatic footprint. Marcos’ statement constitutes a measured and analytically grounded assessment rather than a deliberate provocation.
Nevertheless, Beijing construes Manila’s firm posture in the South China Sea as indicative of potential alignment with the US and Taiwan in any Taiwan-related crisis. Empirically, the principal sources of tension between the Philippines and China derive from Beijing’s assertive behavior, and “gray zone” tactics and operations in the South China Sea, rather than from issues directly related to Taiwan or the US.
Still, Manila is actively acknowledging and engaging Taiwan. The Philippines maintains substantial relations with the nation across multiple sectors. The Philippines earlier this year loosened its decades-old restrictions on officials visiting Taiwan. Jay Tarriela, an outspoken spokesman for the Philippine Coast Guard, last month attended a maritime conference in Taipei, an event that also drew the attention of Beijing.
What China fails to notice and acknowledge is that strengthening ties with Taiwan is not about challenging Beijing; it is about protecting Manila’s interests. Enhanced maritime cooperation between the Philippines and Taiwan is critical, especially in the context of frequent incidents in contested waters, and the need for improved information-sharing, joint exercises and coordinated response mechanisms. Manila is cognizant of the fact that security cannot be geographically compartmentalized, especially in its immediate neighborhood.
Incidents in the South China Sea serve as stark reminders of the high security stakes. Only days ago, a China Coast Guard vessel chased and rammed a Philippine Coast Guard ship near Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island, 黃岩島), one of many episodes of bilateral maritime friction. Taiwan has witnessed Chinese People’s Liberation Army aircraft violating its airspace. These incidents underscore the risks of miscalculation and growing instability, which threaten not just Manila, but also Taipei and Tokyo.
Beyond security, the Philippines has strong human and familial links with Taiwan. More than 160,000 Filipinos live and work in Taiwan, compared with about 12,000 in China. These connections now outweigh purely geopolitical considerations, further highlighting the importance of robust engagement with Taipei. Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy complements these efforts, providing a framework for practical cooperation.
For Manila and Taipei, deterrence, not confrontation with China, is the ultimate objective. By cooperating, they can safeguard sovereignty, protect economic interests and defend their people, yet Beijing refuses to see it this way.
Over the past decade, the Indo-Pacific region has become more contested. Chinese “gray zone” activities have grown more frequent and aggressive, and instability has become the norm. For Manila and other regional players, managing and mitigating the effects of this aggression is the only viable path forward.
In a region where proximity and people-to-people ties matter as much as geopolitics, the Philippines cannot avoid being drawn into the Taiwan-China conflict.
Marcos’ candid acknowledgement of this reality is a clear-eyed assessment of Manila’s strategic environment, and a reminder that sovereignty requires both preparation and prudence. It also underscores the broader lesson for Indo-Pacific nations that strategic clarity, sustained partnerships and regional cooperation are essential to navigate the growing turbulence in the region.
Rahul Mishra is an associate professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, and a senior research fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance at Thammasat University in Thailand.
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