Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Tuesday joined seven other European leaders for talks with US President Donald Trump at the White House. Unlike the February meeting between Trump and Zelenskiy, the Ukrainian leader was not alone this time; he had European allies. However, the real focus of the meeting appeared to be Trump’s strategic ambiguity.
Trump emphasized that while he likes the concept of a ceasefire, it is not a prerequisite to negotiating a peace deal. After the meeting, he wrote on social media about the possibility of trilateral talks between himself, Zelenskiy and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The statements reflect Trump’s ongoing efforts to search for a compromise between a “ceasefire” and “peace,” revealing his attempts to use the battlefield situation as leverage in negotiations with other countries.
The meeting, along with a summit on Friday last week between Trump and Putin in Alaska, offers many geostrategic insights for Taiwan.
During last week’s summit, Putin delivered a carefully crafted eight-and-a-half minute speech on neighborly friendship, and the “common history” between Russia and the US. In reality, it was an attempt to mend US-Russia relations and reframe his strategy on Ukraine as a “security concern.”
Putin expressed trust in Trump and respect for US history to pave the way for negotiations, while subtly previewing his proposal for a land deal. Trump’s response was more direct in comparison. He acknowledged that a final agreement had yet to be reached, but said that they had made “great progress.” He later said that the trilateral summit would serve as a starting point for ending the war.
Just days before Tuesday’s meeting, Trump took to social media to claim that Zelenskiy can end the war “almost immediately, if he wants to.” To European leaders, that was overt pressure. Trump was essentially pushing Ukraine to make significant concessions in negotiations with Russia, raising alarms across Europe.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized that a ceasefire must be reached before the peace process could begin. They are worried that a private deal between Trump and Putin could diminish Ukraine’s negotiating room and turn peace talks into forced capitulation.
Taiwan can draw three core lessons from the meetings:
First is the importance of agenda-setting and establishing dominance over the starting point of negotiations.
Trump was attempting to use the situation on the battlefield as a baseline for peace talks. In other words, whoever has the upper hand on the battlefield has more bargaining power at the meeting table.
That demonstrates a critical need to prevent the Chinese Communist Party from creating any fait accompli of Taiwan — such as through “gray zone” tactics — thereby safeguarding the red line for any negotiations. If a new reality were to be passively accepted as the starting point, negotiations would inevitably lean toward concessions.
Second, security commitments that lack verification mechanisms are nothing but empty promises.
While Trump has floated security guarantees similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and US envoys have even claimed that Russia has reluctantly accepted it, the reality is that such assurances lack concrete implementation methods or plans for the enforcement of penalties in the event of a breach.
The key to determining whether Taiwan can gain more international support lies in establishing high-density surveillance and early-warning systems, and intelligence-sharing and military exercises with allies. Real-world cooperation is the core of any credible security assurance.
Last, a country cannot outsource international support; it must lead and control the narrative itself.
Zelenskiy’s decision to bring seven European leaders with him to Washington was strategic. Understanding clearly that facing Trump alone could leave him at a disadvantage, he opted to approach negotiations in a team format, avoiding a repeat of the isolation and public humiliation he had to deal with in February.
Faced with the risk of a cross-strait conflict, if Taiwan fails to articulate its own narrative and position in collaborating with its regional neighbors or like-minded democracies, it could be defined in international negotiations as a troublemaker rather than a peacekeeper.
The Trump-Zelenskiy meeting and the Trump-Putin summit are strategic demonstrations of how global powers shape and manipulate the narrative of peace.
Now is not the time for Taiwan to be a wallflower — rather, Taiwanese must be analysts, preparers and actors. It must view any potential meetings or negotiations between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) as a starting point to analyze and prepare for all possible scenarios.
Liao Ming-hui is an assistant researcher at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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