US lobbyist Christian Whiton has published an update to his article, “How Taiwan Lost Trump,” discussed on the editorial page on Sunday. His new article, titled “What Taiwan Should Do” refers to the three articles published in the Taipei Times, saying that none had offered a solution to the problems he identified.
That is fair. The articles pushed back on points Whiton made that were felt partisan, misdirected or uninformed; in this response, he offers solutions of his own. While many are on point and he would find no disagreement here, the nuances of the political and historical complexities in Taiwan would still serve as useful context.
Whiton says he is a friend of Taiwan, and the harsh criticisms in the original article were to be taken as hard truths offered in this light. It is true, Whiton has spoken much about the challenges the US faces from the Chinese Communist Party and of the importance of deterring an invasion of Taiwan. These concerns are behind his frustration with the perceived inaction in Taiwan to face up to reality.
He starts with national defense, writing that Taiwan should “establish a clear concept of Taiwanese independent self-defense.” Absolutely it should. It is a point of intense frustration in Taiwan that there should be any doubt about this point. It was one of the causes for the rise of the mass recall movement. Huge swathes of civil society are with Whiton on this one, as is the government. The opposition, not so much.
He goes on to recommend that Taiwan develop an independent satellite network, and that it is right not to trust SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, asking: “Who would trust a man with a car factory in China?”
No, Taiwan should not trust Musk, and nothing Musk has said about Taiwan in the past would recommend that it should.
Whiton also writes that the government should allow for a militia and defense-in-depth, and “prepare and publicly debate plans to fight throughout the island.” These are things already being explored in Taiwan and which should be encouraged.
He then moves on to the question of support for Taiwan in Washington, which is absolutely his beat, and it would be foolish not to listen.
However, we can reserve most attention for the section that begins with the imperative “Redefine Taiwan as Taiwan.” Yes, Taiwan needs to do this. It is a constant bugbear within the country, and one that strikes to the heart of the historical, political and ideological dichotomy between the Democratic Progressive Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), and between the pro-localization and pro-China sides of the debate.
Whiton mentions removing the portrait of Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙) from the Legislative Yuan and the currency, repurposing the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall as a museum of democracy and getting China Airlines and China Steel Corp to change their names to something less misleading.
We could also add the renaming of street names such as Jhongjheng Road (中正路) — referring to Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) — and of doing away with the absurd name “Chinese Taipei” for the Taiwanese team in international sports events. Whiton summarizes this idea as “Taiwan should intellectually sever itself from the Republic of China [ROC] concept.”
He knows what the KMT is. He knows it is the second-largest political party in Taiwan. He presumably also knows that the existence of the ROC runs to the ideological core of what the KMT is. This is no solution, it is an aspiration.
His conclusion is that Taiwan should “embrace reality even when painful, and to get on with life,” and that “Taiwan’s future would not be decided in Washington or Beijing. It would be decided in Taiwan.”
Spoken like a true friend.
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