An article posted on the online platform Substack, titled “How Taiwan Lost Trump” and written by former US Department of State official and lobbyist Christian Whiton, has attracted more attention than it warrants.
There are two op-ed pieces in today’s Taipei Times from either end of the political spectrum. Simon Tang (湯先鈍), an adjunct professor at California State University, is a US-based Taiwanese writing from a perspective skeptical of US President Donald Trump; journalist Hanna Shen is a Polish national and long-term Taiwan resident, representing a more conservative point of view. Although ideologically diverse, both are critical of Whiton’s article.
Published yesterday on the Radio Taiwan International Web site, an interview titled “Answering Christian Whiton on Taiwan and Trump” refers to Whiton as a “previously unknown author.” The interviewee, Yeh Chieh-ting (葉介庭) of US Taiwan Watch, explains that Taiwanese often incorrectly believe that articles such as Whiton’s reflect the US administration’s thinking.
Whiton presents a distinctly right-wing bias, often falling into diatribes about “MAGA” talking points, and rants against “lefties” and policies of former US president Joe Biden. His basic point is that the Democratic Progressive Party administrations of former president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and President William Lai (賴清德) have failed to display a sufficiently subservient approach to US demands, cozying up to Biden and following progressive policies that are likely to irk the current US administration within the context of the ascendant US right.
Whiton reserves particular distaste for Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴), taking up one-quarter of the almost 3,000-word article in his criticism of her apparent indiscretions in her former role as representative to the US and as vice president.
Just as Whiton complains that Taiwan’s leaders demonstrate little understanding of the nuances of power dynamics and public sentiment in the US, he shows himself to be ignorant of them in Taiwan, and of having a shallow understanding of the culture and issues here.
His criticism of Hsiao wearing a mask “despite being outdoors” at Trump’s inauguration as “a symbol of the Taiwanese government’s unfortunate pandemic response” betrays a skewed take on Taiwan’s successful response to COVID-19 and suggests that Whiton has never been to East Asia.
His understanding of the recall movement is lacking, and it seems that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has had his ear, given the level of KMT talking points that he repeats.
Whiton fares equally badly on his appraisal of the government’s energy policy, saying that it shut down “the country’s nuclear power plant ... to appease environmentalists,” ignoring the salient facts of the number of plants, major tectonic faults and the government’s wish to cohere with international trends.
He is more relevant on criticisms of deregulation and openness to US business investments, but he leaves these to a small section at the end of the article.
Whiton seems to be saying that Taiwan’s approach has been haplessly one-sided, cleaving too closely to the Democrats and the “lefty” sensibilities, as if the government were following the Democrats’ lead rather than devising its own policy decisions based on its own convictions.
He is saying that Taiwan has “lost Trump” because the government has failed to pander wholesale to the instincts of an emerging political force in the US that he himself concedes will not always be in power. This would require predicting the trajectory of a notoriously mercurial president.
Whiton’s conclusion needs to be taken into account, but not necessarily for the reason he thinks it does. Yes, Taiwan needs to rethink its approach to the US; standing together with it as an ally in East Asia no longer cuts it, unless Taipei wants to act in a substantially subservient way, and to form its policy based on the cultural and national policy instincts of a foreign country.
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