US President Donald Trump’s alleged request that Taiwanese President William Lai (賴清德) not stop in New York while traveling to three of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, after his administration also rescheduled a visit to Washington by the minister of national defense, sets an unwise precedent and risks locking the US into a trajectory of either direct conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or capitulation to it over Taiwan.
Taiwanese authorities have said that no plans to request a stopover in the US had been submitted to Washington, but Trump shared a direct call with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in June, in which Xi allegedly encouraged the US not to take steps with Taiwan that might antagonize Beijing ahead of conditionally offered trade negotiations.
If, as has been claimed, Trump snubbed Taiwanese officials to “win” a meeting with Xi, it would fit a familiar pattern: Maintaining investment in long-term diplomatic relationships that do not earn the US economy much in gross fiscal terms is considered pointless and an impediment to “winning” better trade conditions for US corporations in the short term.
In his attempts to create seismic shocks in US policy, Trump has shown himself capable of lashing out at any nation or bloc regardless of whether they are US allies, official enemies or sit somewhere in between.
As well as contending with whether Trump would throw Taiwan on the negotiating table, Taipei is fighting to win as best a tariff deal as they can with Washington, while ensuring the US actually delivers the weapons Taiwan has already bought.
Trump’s indecision on tariffs suggests a low information and reckless impulsiveness that are again already deeply destabilizing long-standing US treaty relationships and commitments to allies.
The Taiwan Policy Centre believes it instructive to look at the historical record for what happens when national leaders wrench macroeconomic levers to produce better-looking figures for government public relations. The words “catastrophic,” “self-defeating,” “hubristic” and “folly” jump out from the pages. Often in the end, in big red dripping letters, another word appears: “war.”
Taiwan is the PRC’s self-professed core issue. The US remains the single-largest obstacle and deterrent to Beijing’s completely baseless and politically indefensible claim over Taiwan.
Up until now, the US has held its line, and it has attempted to elide the Gordian knot, neither pulling on it nor unpicking it too much in either direction. US policy was consistent with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which declared the final status of Taiwan and “possession” of it as yet to be determined, and all subsequent multilateral agreements and communications on the matter.
Where former US president Joe Biden made clear the US’ resolve to not let a PRC attack on Taiwan go unanswered, as did Trump in his first term, it seems second-term Trump could be considering using certain established semiofficial US-Taiwan interactions as leverage for negotiations with China.
In diplomacy, every piece is important, every signal parsed. Bluffs called and cards played are difficult, sometimes impossible, to regain or replace. It is in vacuums of diplomatic uncertainty and inconsistency, where international agreements collapse almost as soon as they are inked, that states with resolve, clear objectives and patience often see their opportunity for strategic moves to significantly strengthen their own position.
There is no doubt the PRC sees a Trump visit to Beijing as one of those maximal opportunities.
Taiwanese are rightly worried that Trump will play the US team into a corner where Beijing dangles “a deal it would not want to refuse” — in exchange for Taiwan, or ending all US interaction with Taiwan. Trump could, in desiring to sign “The Deal of the Century,” inadvertently allow Beijing to turn him into a catalyst for such a deal.
In being cavalier with an established and delicate interplay between two world powers to avert a potentially global conflict over Taiwan, Trump does not make peace more likely; he narrows the arc of probability toward either being forced to confront China militarily or capitulate on its core demands, both at a timetable set by Beijing.
The latter would betray 23 million Taiwanese, leaving them at the mercy of a state that has vowed to root out and eliminate “separatists.” Taiwan would face the same tragedy as it did in 1945, all over again. It took them 37 years to free themselves from martial law and dictatorship last time.
Trump’s brash “dealmaking” not only sends a worrying signal to Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines; it would likely only convince more Taiwanese that the US is an unreliable ally.
As one of the closest US allies, it also leaves the UK unclear as to the US commitment to Taiwan; the AUKUS partnership of Australia, the UK and the US; and the security of the wider western Pacific, after the UK expressed its willingness to help forces drawn into a war to defend Taiwan.
Trump must keep Taiwan out of any negotiation for risk of sparking the touch paper of China’s clearly signaled intentions for illegal war, invasion, occupation and annexation of Taiwan.
Ben Goren is director of communications for the Taiwan Policy Centre.
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