National defense is not just about weapons and alliances. It begins in daily life — around the dinner table, at the pharmacy, when you turn on the tap or switch on the light.
If Taiwan is serious about defending itself — not only from invasion, but from paralysis — it must broaden its definition of defense and who it involves.
And here lies a political opportunity — one that President William Lai (賴清德) cannot afford to squander. Polls show his disapproval topping 50 percent and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) support collapsing to below 30 percent. That is not just a warning sign; it is a flashing red alarm. This government has already lost the confidence of half the people it claims to lead. That is not merely a security gap — it is a trust gap.
Unless Lai acts decisively, that gap will become a canyon that swallows his presidency.
For decades, the DPP’s core brand has been unambiguous: China is a hostile foreign power, Taiwan is a sovereign nation and sovereignty must be defended at all costs. Now is the moment for the Lai administration to turn that creed into policy that the public can touch — a national civil resilience plan. It is a plan not just about survival — it is the living proof that this government will walk the talk when it comes to protecting Taiwan from its greatest threat.
That is the kind of competence people need — and need to see.
The recall campaign failed, partly because the charges against the opposition were too abstract — overreach, sabotage, obstruction, etc. Voters did not feel it in their own lives. A civil resilience plan would change that. It would replace mere words with relatable needs: rice in warehouses, fuel for ambulances, medicine on pharmacy shelves. If the opposition supports the plan, Taiwan grows stronger. If it blocks it, it would be exposed — not in ideology or viewpoint, but in fact.
A stockpile of rice is not ideological. Fuel for ambulances is not partisan. Having clean water is not a point of view. It is time to make “peace through strength” more than a concept, a strategy or a slogan. It is time to show how it works — and then make it work.
For too long, debates about national defense have obsessed over weapons and procurement, as if billion-dollar contracts could substitute for resilience. They cannot.
China does not need to storm the beaches to break Taiwan. A blockade, a cyberattack or a slow encirclement would test not our jets, but our stamina. Will families have food and clean water? Will hospitals keep the lights on? Will children get their medicine? These are not side issues. They are survival itself.
The Lai administration has pledged “peace through strength.” Civil resilience is a cardinal strength. It means stockpiles that last, infrastructure that survives stress and households that know what to do when bombs fall. Taiwan already has pieces of this puzzle — disaster response teams, fuel reserves and volunteer networks — but pieces are not enough. What is missing is a national plan that unites them into a shield the public can see and trust.
We need an affirmative answer from anyone on the street when asked what they would do if war with China broke out tomorrow.
That is why the government must unveil a comprehensive resilience plan — not next year, not after budget fights, but now. Expand food and medicine reserves, decentralize fuel storage and harden critical infrastructure against attack. Most importantly, bring the public in. Panic stops with knowledge. For instance, let the people know that Taiwan could survive a blockade for at least six months. Give citizens clear, accessible guidance on how to prepare their homes, support their neighborhoods and stay informed in a crisis.
This is not a call for panic. It is a call for responsibility. Responsible democracies do this. Finland, Sweden, Japan and Ukraine all engage their citizens because they understand that survival begins long before the first shot is fired.
Besides, transparency builds trust. Preparation builds unity. And unity is what Taiwan lacks most today.
If the Lai administration advances a resilience plan, it will not just defend Taiwan’s sovereignty — it will defend its legitimacy in the eyes of its own people.
When different parts of the plan are rolled out, there will be no hiding behind complexity or spin. Anyone who opposes it — whether in the media, on talk shows or in the legislature — will reveal themselves not as “critics” or “skeptics,” but as people intent on endangering lives and weakening Taiwan’s defenses. The betrayal will be undeniable — and unmistakably real.
Taiwan should have been ready yesterday. Tomorrow might still be just in time — but only if the Lai administration acts today.
John Cheng is a retired businessman from Hong Kong living in Taiwan.
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