A photograph of the Dalai Lama wearing a baseball cap with the words “Team Taiwan” during his 90th birthday celebration in Dharamsala, India, on Sunday is at once amusing and endearing. The message behind the image is far more profound than the immediate mirth.
That “Team Taiwan” is a thing at all, in apposition to “Chinese Taipei,” is an affirmation of Taiwan’s sovereignty and a rejection of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) narrative. That an internationally influential figure is willing to wear it at all is a rarity.
The affirmation is a theme that the Dalai Lama, Tibetans and Taiwanese can rally behind. It is an expression of the local “writ international,” of the idea that China’s relations with Tibet and Taiwan are not “domestic issues”: They are not only of international concern, they are international.
At what point does the local become international? It was reassuring to read the analysis of the geopolitical expert Ian Bremmer in yesterday’s Taipei Times (“Lai’s tough talk stoking tensions,” July 9, p8), in which he provides an informed, objective, nuanced summary of what is happening in Taiwan and brings out a sense of the international ramifications of what at first appears to be a local issue: the mass recall movement.
Bremmer mentions President William Lai’s (賴清德) proposed 17 steps to counter the threat from China and the CCP’s infiltration efforts, and also the 10 planned “national unity” speeches asserting cultural and political independence from China. He gives the context of the legislative situation, and writes how Lai and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are backing — not orchestrating — the recall vote.
He writes that Lai’s rhetoric is “for domestic consumption,” and that China’s military planners would likely be preparing a show of force in response; from there he moves onto the possibility of an invasion attempt and potential US involvement, bringing the situation very much into the international realm.
If the recalls are successful, Lai could take his foot off the gas, be less provocative in his rhetoric and reduce tensions, Bremmer writes.
Implicit in this analysis is that the international community could breathe a sigh of relief, that Lai and the DPP, vulnerable to being accused of rocking the boat in already dangerously choppy waters, could pull back from the brink.
“If the DPP ... regains control of the legislature, Lai will have fewer incentives to reach for the nationalist megaphone; if it falls short, he will keep the volume — and the danger level — elevated,” he wrote.
The local has become international. However, the analysis falls down, on at least three counts:
First, the tensions are unlikely to decrease, because the CCP has no intention of releasing the pressure. It needs it to keep Taiwanese intimidated and the international community on tenterhooks.
Second, local political tensions would not abate. When the recall votes are over, whatever the outcome, this would not be the end of it. The mass recall is a grassroots movement, not orchestrated — albeit encouraged — by the DPP, and in Lai’s national talks on unity, the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party would not allow truth to get between them and what they consider to be justified revenge.
Finally, Lai has no intention of taking his foot off the gas. His strategic arc thus far has been to reinforce the message on Taiwan’s sovereign rights, and he is continuing with this: see the discussion in the op-ed on this page by National Taiwan University professor Chiang Huang-chih (姜皇池) of Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung’s (林佳龍) speech at the ILA-ASIL Asia-Pacific Research Forum on Monday.
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