After considerable delay, the European Commission has presented its proposal to set a 90 percent target for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions by 2040, which is to be deliberated by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. The bloc has already positioned itself as a climate leader, setting an ambitious 2030 emissions-reduction goal that it is on track to meet. However, with its new focus on regaining economic competitiveness and military might, the EU has been grappling with a practical and moral question: Will it continue to set the global standard for climate action?
To be sure, the EU stands to benefit from adopting the proposed 2040 target. Increasing its use of renewables would bolster energy security, reduce geopolitical risk and stabilize its economy, owing to lower and more predictable power costs.
However, the bloc’s commitment to decarbonization also has global implications. The clean-energy transition offers the best chance of achieving broad-based prosperity, and the world cannot afford for the EU to reverse course. Such leadership is especially important as countries finalize their updated nationally determined contributions — climate-action plans for the next five years — ahead of the UN Climate Change Conference (COP30) in Belem, Brazil.
What might seem like a technocratic exercise in emissions accounting affects countless lives and livelihoods, particularly in global south countries that have borne the brunt of a crisis largely created by the global north. Communities across Africa are already suffering the devastating effects of climate change, including heat waves, crop failures and coastal erosion.
Last year, flash floods affected more than 1 million people in Nigeria. In Uganda, families are losing their homes and land to landslides triggered by heavy rains. Despite contributing the least to global warming, such countries are facing its most severe consequences, and falling deeper into poverty as a result.
Moreover, many global south governments are caught in a debt trap, with high interest payments limiting their ability to invest in climate adaptation and mitigation. Their inability to manage worsening climate conditions could result in up to 216 million people being internally displaced by 2050, including nearly 86 million internal climate-change migrants in sub-Saharan Africa.
With cross-border climate-induced migration also likely to increase, EU leaders must decide whether to confront the root causes of displacement or treat its symptoms by fortifying the bloc’s borders — an undertaking that could prove more challenging and costly than decarbonization.
Failure to adopt the proposed 2040 target would be a betrayal of the people and countries with the least influence and the most to lose, but I do not expect the bloc to choose between its own interests and those of the global south, because the target benefits everyone.
Cutting emissions by 90 percent by 2040 would save the EU more than 850 billion euros (US$1 trillion) in fossil-fuel imports, eliminate its dependence on foreign gas supplies and create two million new jobs in green industries. That is why many European businesses and investors support the target. It would also substantially reduce household energy bills and toxic air pollution, improving financial and human health across the continent.
Maintaining an ambitious climate policy would also offer the EU an opportunity to rebuild trust with global south governments, many of which have grown disillusioned with the Western liberal order after broken climate-finance promises, foreign-aid cuts, vaccine hoarding during the COVID-19 pandemic and limited support for the newly operationalized loss and damage fund.
African countries, in particular, are closely following the EU’s actions, wondering whether years of lofty rhetoric about climate justice would finally translate into decisive action.
The signs are not promising. France, despite playing a crucial role in the ratification of the 2015 Paris Agreement, is leading efforts to weaken the 2040 target. Instead of displaying climate vision and leadership when they are needed most, French President Emmanuel Macron’s administration has argued for “outsourcing” up to 7 percent of the emissions reduction to non-EU countries by incorporating carbon credits into the target proposal.
Such indifference has a high cost. If the EU fails to submit an ambitious nationally determined contribution, it risks undermining the global fight against climate change. Other countries might follow the bloc’s example and water down their own commitments. The chance to set bold collective goals ahead of COP30 would be lost, and Europe’s credibility, especially among climate-vulnerable countries, would take another hit.
Climate justice cannot be postponed any longer. The EU’s decision on the 2040 target would shape the outcome of COP30 and, by extension, the crucial next phase of climate action. The world is watching to see if Europe will take responsibility for its historic role in the climate crisis and invest in a safe and dignified future for everyone. Given a chance to draw a clear line between past and future — between cowardice and courage — the EU must make the right choice.
Vanessa Nakate is a Ugandan climate-justice activist and the author of A Bigger Picture.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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