I appreciate Michael Turton’s engagement (“Notes from Central Taiwan: What does ‘understanding China’ really mean?” June 23, page 12) with my recent piece on cross-strait relations (“Ma’s China visit; DPP’s [Democratic Progressive Party’s] blind spot,” June 18, page 8), although I find myself compelled to respond to several fundamental mischaracterizations of my arguments and Taiwan’s strategic interests.
Turton’s critique inadvertently demonstrates the very problem I sought to address: the reduction of complex geopolitical realities to simplistic binaries. His assertion that any engagement with Beijing necessarily serves “PRC [People’s Republic of China] interests” while Taiwan’s interests require complete isolation reflects precisely the kind of zero-sum thinking that has left Taiwan with fewer options, not more.
When South Korea maintains extensive unofficial channels with North Korea through business, cultural and academic exchanges — even during periods of heightened tension — do we conclude that Seoul is serving Pyongyang’s interests? When Israel maintains robust back-channel communications with adversaries through former officials and academic institutions, is this capitulation to hostile forces?
Sophisticated democracies understand that engagement and resistance are not mutually exclusive: They can, and must, coexist in a comprehensive strategy.
Turton said that former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) cannot represent “Taiwan’s voice” because his views are not mainstream. That misses a crucial point about the nature of unofficial diplomacy. Ma’s value lies not in representing majority opinion, but in providing Beijing with authentic insight into Taiwan’s democratic complexity — including voices that Beijing finds more palatable.
That serves Taiwan’s interests in several ways. First, it provides a channel for communication during periods when official dialogue is impossible. Second, it forces Beijing to engage with Taiwan’s democratic reality rather than its simplified caricatures. Third, it creates space for Taiwan to influence Chinese perceptions and calculations.
Does this mean endorsing Ma’s political positions? Absolutely not. It means recognizing that in a complex relationship, Taiwan benefits from multiple voices engaging Beijing, not just those that confirm Chinese prejudices about Taiwanese “separatism.”
Turton takes particular exception to my use of terms such as “sophisticated” and “nuanced,” reading these as class-based attacks on the DPP. That interpretation says more about our political discourse than about my intentions.
When I call for sophistication, I mean the kind of strategic thinking that can hold multiple ideas simultaneously: that Beijing poses a genuine threat and engagement can serve Taiwan’s interests; that Ma’s politics are problematic and his role can be strategically useful; that the DPP’s caution is understandable and its reflexive opposition limits Taiwan’s options.
This is not about social class — it is about intellectual complexity. Taiwan’s survival depends on our ability to navigate contradictions, not resolve them into comfortable simplicities.
Perhaps most troubling is Turton’s dismissal of the importance of mutual understanding. He argues that Beijing already understands Taiwan well enough, and that Taiwan understands China sufficiently. That fundamentally misunderstands how strategic relationships work.
Understanding is not a binary state of “you either have it or you do not.” It is a continuous process requiring constant recalibration. Beijing’s understanding of Taiwan is filtered through their ideological lens and strategic imperatives. Taiwan’s understanding of China is similarly constrained by our own political divisions and emotional reactions.
The goal of engagement is not to achieve perfect understanding — it is to reduce the risk of catastrophic miscalculation. In a relationship where one side has 1,400 missiles pointed at the other, the costs of misunderstanding are measured in lives, not political points.
Rather than continuing to debate whether Ma’s trip was right or wrong, we should focus on how Taiwan can develop a more comprehensive approach to cross-strait relations. Instead of treating every engagement as either blessed or treasonous, Taiwan could develop guidelines for how different actors — former officials, academics and business leaders — can contribute to a coherent strategy. That would require establishing formal mechanisms for unofficial dialogue that serve our interests, while maintaining plausible deniability for the government.
Such an approach would also necessitate more strategic communication from Taipei. Rather than simply condemning or endorsing individual trips, Taiwan could develop messaging that explains how engagement serves the nation’s broader strategic goals. This connects to a broader need for public education, as Taiwanese deserve a more nuanced understanding of how diplomacy works in complex relationships.
The current discourse of heroes and traitors serves no one’s interests except those who benefit from Taiwan’s internal divisions.
Turton and I might disagree about tactics, but we share a deep love for Taiwan and its democratic way of life. The question is not whether Taiwan should engage Beijing — various forms of engagement are inevitable given our economic and geographic realities. The question is whether that engagement serves Taiwan’s interests or Beijing’s.
My argument is simple: Uncoordinated, ad hoc engagement serves Beijing’s interests by creating confusion and division in Taiwan, while coordinated, strategic engagement — even when it includes voices we disagree with — can serve Taiwan’s interests by providing more tools to shape Chinese behavior and perceptions.
Taiwan’s future depends not on ideological purity, but on our ability to navigate an increasingly complex world with wisdom, flexibility and unity of purpose.
Y. Tony Yang is an endowed professor and associate dean at George Washington University.
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