Over-the-top (OTT) boxes might be used by China as a channel for influence campaigns in Taiwan, Cable Broadband Institute in Taiwan chief executive officer Claudia Peng (彭淑芬) said on June 8.
Peng said that more than 7 million OTT devices used to stream Chinese content have been imported into Taiwan, and that the devices are “used as tools of cognitive warfare, quietly influencing the culture and ideology of Taiwan’s young people without people realizing it.”
Many hotels have Chinese OTT boxes installed in rooms, and the content they offer includes Chinese state media broadcaster China Central Television and various provincial satellite channels, she said.
However, despite the known potential for Chinese OTT boxes to be used for cognitive warfare, tackling their use remains challenging due to legislative limitations. To begin with, there is no law specifically designed to target cognitive warfare.
The National Security Act (國家安全法) covers collusion with foreign forces, and the Anti-Infiltration Act (反滲透法) addresses election influence campaigns and the disruption of public order, but neither has stipulations specifically prohibiting the consumption or dissemination of “united front” content.
The devices allegedly stream copyrighted content without authorization, which would be a contravention of the Copyright Act (著作權法), Peng said, adding that the law requires approval for the broadcast of Chinese programs.
However, if the government moved to ban OTT boxes, there would likely be protests, especially among those in the pan-blue camp and who hope for unification with China. Moreover, such a move would be ineffective, since such content can still be accessed from any personal computer or mobile device.
Illegally broadcasting the channels also constitutes a contravention of the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例), she said.
Authorities could impose fines on establishments found to be publicly broadcasting copyrighted content, but an outright ban on Chinese programming would be unlikely to have the intended effect. Young people are always likely to find ways to access the content they are interested in. A better solution to tackle cognitive warfare would be for Taiwan to invest more in the domestic film and TV industry.
For example, the Ministry of Culture could provide funding to studios that create programming highlighting unique aspects of Taiwanese society, Hoklo-language (commonly known as Taiwanese) content, and generally anything that speaks to a Taiwanese identity and cultural experience.
There might be pushback from opposition party members who espouse a cross-strait cultural identity, but the ministry could assure them that such programming would not be “anti-China” or intentionally refute aspects of a shared historical experience between Chinese and a portion of Taiwanese.
Instead, the focus could be on “Taiwanese” content, promoting the values that Taiwanese universally share. For example, referencing Taiwan’s diversity and free speech, liberty, democracy and the legalization of same-sex marriage.
There could also be content that portrays conscription — an experience shared by many Taiwanese men — and armed forces personnel as heroes.
While attempts to restrict Taiwanese access to certain information and content — even that considered harmful to Taiwan’s democracy — might be an uphill battle, the challenge offers a good opportunity to take seriously the funding of Taiwan’s own cultural industries, ensuring the production of high-quality, compelling content that resonates with Taiwanese audiences and reflects their values, interests and identity.
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