At the St Petersburg International Economic Forum on Friday last week, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto declared: “Russia and China have never had double standards.” His remark, made while G7 leaders gathered in Canada and as the Israel-Iran war escalated, was meant as a jab at Western hypocrisy, but in seeking to challenge one set of double standards, Prabowo embraced another — and in doing so, undermined the very principle he sought to defend.
Yes, the West often deserves criticism. Its selective outrage over global conflicts, persistent support for Israel despite civilian suffering in Gaza, and history of interventionist missteps have not gone unnoticed, especially in the global south. Prabowo’s frustration is understandable. However, to suggest that Russia and especially China are somehow free from this same duplicity is dangerously naive.
China excels at the politics of double standards. Consider its actions in the South China Sea. Beijing speaks of multilateralism and peaceful coexistence under the UN Charter. Yet its militarization of artificial islands, harassment of Philippine vessels and sweeping territorial claims — dismissed by a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling — all constitute clear violations of international law. China rejected the tribunal’s decision, continues to ignore UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provisions and uses maritime militias to assert its dominance in disputed waters. This is not a principled defense of sovereignty; it is coercion, cloaked in nationalist rhetoric.
Even more troubling is the contradiction between China’s professed support for oppressed peoples and its conduct in Xinjiang. Beijing detains more than 1 million Uighurs and other Muslim minorities in what independent observers have called crimes against humanity. It has systematically erased religious and cultural expression in the name of “counterterrorism.”
While China routinely positions itself as a voice for the global south, it allows no critique of its domestic repression.
On Taiwan — a democracy with vibrant institutions and open debate — China’s stance is perhaps the most blatant double standard. It demands noninterference while issuing military threats against Taipei. Beijing’s claim that it opposes hegemonic behavior rings hollow when it seeks to coerce nations and corporations into submission.
Even on the Israel-Iran war, China’s rhetoric is notably restrained. Although it expresses support for a “two-state solution,” Beijing has little appetite for meaningful diplomacy that might upset ties with Israel — or expose its own vulnerabilities on Xinjiang or Hong Kong.
Prabowo champions Indonesia’s long-standing “independent and active” foreign policy, but independence must not devolve into selective blindness. Replacing Western hypocrisy with Chinese or Russian duplicity is not balanced diplomacy. It is capitulation to another form of power politics.
Indonesia, like Taiwan and many nations in Asia, faces increasing pressure to choose sides in a world becoming more polarized. However, true leadership — especially from a rising democracy — lies not in amplifying one superpower’s narrative over another’s. It lies in calling out injustice wherever it appears.
The global south does not need more apologists for authoritarian powers. It needs consistent advocates for sovereignty, democracy and human rights. Taiwan, living daily with the consequences of China’s double standards, knows this truth well.
It is not only the West that must be held to account — so too must those who invoke justice while practicing domination.
Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is director of the China-Indonesia Desk at the Center of Economic and Law Studies in Jakarta. Yeta Purnama is a researcher at China-Indonesia Desk, Center of Economic and Law Studies.
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