Caught in the crossfire, Qatar on Monday night found itself in the unusual position of being asked by the US to mediate to end a war where one of the two parties was firing missiles at it. However, then there are few countries as multifaceted as Qatar, or few conflicts quite as tangled as the Iran-Israel war.
It seems Monday’s heavily signaled Iranian attack on Qatar’s 24-hectare Al Udeid air base, the largest US military facility in the Middle East, might even have become the opening to resume diplomacy. The attack, which caused no casualties, cleared the ground for US President Donald Trump and Qatar to work together to secure the fragile ceasefire between Israel and Iran. It once again highlights Qatar’s role as professional mediator — a bespoke service this tiny, but massively wealthy country makes available from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Gaza.
Ever since Israel launched its attack on Iran about two weeks ago, Qatar has been at the forefront of the countries denouncing it, saying it considered the assault “a blatant violation of Iran’s sovereignty and security, as well as a clear breach of international law.”
However, Qatar also, free of charge, houses the vast Al Udeid air base used by the US, one of the protagonists in the war against Iran. Over the years it is estimated Qatar has spent US$8 billion on the infrastructure of the base, an investment that buys it US goodwill despite the state’s politics being very different from Trump’s “America first.”
Iran’s relations with Qatar have also been on a steady upward curve, especially since Iran acted as a friend of Qatar when the state was being boycotted by its Gulf allies.
Iran’s Monday night missile salvo was a symbolic, almost courteous, attack on the US air base in response to US strikes on its nuclear facilities. Trump afterward thanked Iran for giving advance warning and time for the air base to be cleared.
Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs Sultan bin Saad bin Sultan al Muraikhi issued a “strong condemnation” of the attack, and told Iranian Ambassador to Qatar Ali Salehabadi that Doha had a right to respond, yet at the same time Qatari Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Majed al-Ansari balanced a condemnation of Iran’s actions by pointing out that Qatar had been one of the first countries to warn against the dangers of Israeli escalation in the region.
For its part, the Iranian Supreme National Security Council said it “remains committed to maintaining and continuing warm and historic relations” with Qatar.
Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei insisted Tehran would not allow US and Israeli “criminal aggressions and malign policies” to create divisions between it and “brotherly” regional states.
Rarely has such an intrusion of another country’s sovereignty been accompanied by so much regret.
Indeed, almost as soon as the near performative bombs were fended off by Qatar’s air defenses, Trump called Qatari officials to see if he could have the conversation required with the Iranians to secure their agreement to a ceasefire. Iran’s position since the conflict started has been that the onus lies with Israel to stop striking, but if Trump delivered an Israeli ceasefire Tehran would respond, Qatar was told.
Qatar’s value to the region as the one country that can talk to the US’ greatest enemies — whether the Taliban, Hamas or Iran — came good again.
Qatar has also worked the White House well, not just by providing Trump with a converted new Air Force One, but by being trusted by Democrats and Republicans alike.
Its value was underscored by Trump’s Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff in an interview with Tucker Carlson. Witkoff showered praise on Qatar, saying that “they’re criticized for not being well motivated. It’s preposterous. They are well motivated. They’re good, decent people. What they want is a mediation that’s effective, that gets to a peace goal, and why? Because they’re a small nation and they want to be acknowledged as a peacemaker.”
Asked if they were Iran’s agents, Witkoff responded: “Look, they’re a Muslim nation. In the past, they’ve had some views that are a little bit more radical, but it’s moderated quite a bit. They pay for every dollar of the air base. They don’t have their hand out for a thing. There is nothing that the United States has to fund with regard to that air base. That’s pretty unusual.”
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