The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long touted its “one country, two systems” formula as a successful model of governance — one that it says not only allows Hong Kong and Macau to retain their systems and freedoms, but also demonstrates the party’s tolerance for diverse institutions.
However, from the political oppression that followed Hong Kong’s 2019 anti-extradition law protests, to the arrest of two journalists from All About Macau Media (論盡媒體) in April, it has become increasingly clear that “one country, two systems” is merely transitional rhetoric on the inevitable path toward “one system.”
On April 17, two journalists from All About Macau Media were denied entry into Macau’s Legislative Assembly building, taken away by police and detained for 11 hours. The two could face criminal charges for the “disruption of the operation of organs of the Macau Special Administrative Region (MSAR),” a Chinese-language report by the BBC said.
This incident not only demonstrates a crisis for journalistic freedom, but it is also clear evidence of a broader move by the CCP toward systemic unification.
The MSAR government outwardly maintains a commitment to press freedom, but in practice, it has employed subsidies, interview restrictions and political censorship to gradually bring all media outlets under its control. After refusing government subsidies, All About Macau Media became an uncontrollable exception and, as a result, became the first target of government suppression.
Since Beijing increased its emphasis on national security in 2019, Macau has followed Hong Kong’s example in cracking down on civil groups and public demonstrations. It has shifted its attention to suppressing the media.
All About Macau is known for exposing sensitive issues such as shady land deals and collusion between the government and businesses, making it a thorn in the regime’s side. The CCP has consistently employed a pre-emptive approach to eliminate “unstable” factors and retroactively legitimize its actions. The arrests in Macau are just the latest manifestation of this strategy.
Reports have also revealed that even Portuguese-language media in Macau — which have long enjoyed relative freedom — such as the Portuguese-language division of public broadcaster TDM, were given specific patriotic guidelines in 2021, prompting five Portuguese journalists to resign.
This illustrates that the crackdown is not aimed at any language or stance, but rather at all media professionals who possess critical thinking and journalistic integrity. No one who exposes the truth or calls the government’s actions into question is spared.
This widespread and fast-paced tightening of government control mirrors Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong — passing the National Security Law and the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, shutting down pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily and arresting Hong Kong media mogul Jimmy Lai (黎智英) — and reflects a governance logic aimed toward achieving a “one system” model.
Under such an abrupt breakdown, the news environment has deteriorated to the point where even frontline journalists refer to themselves as word-processing automaton, and the whole of civil society has all but fallen silent.
In the BBC’s report, journalist Yu Weiying (余偉英) — who has worked in Macau for 16 years — detailed the increased pressure and anxiety that has filled the newsroom since 2019, stating that the situation has only worsened since Macanese Chief Executive Sam Hou Fai (浩輝) took office in December last year and began intensifying the government’s media blockade.
Reporters are no longer allowed to ask questions or approach event sites. Information is disseminated solely through unified news releases — just as is the standard practice in mainland China. Given the arrest of All About Macau journalists, the deletion of news articles and the denial of interview access, there is no longer any need to continue disguising Macau as a “special administrative region.”
CCP officials have repeatedly attempted to demonstrate the apparent smooth implementation of the party’s “one country, two systems” framework in Macau to the international community to contrast its stability with the civil unrest in Hong Kong. However, Macau is in the process of transitioning into a new phase of censorship and political purges, revealing that the so-called coexistence of two systems has always been a mere illusion.
When journalists can no longer freely ask questions, when news outlets can no longer expose the truth without consequences and when the media cannot survive independently, the concept of “two systems” naturally ceases to exist. All that remains is an authoritarian machine, operating in the name of “national security” while gradually eliminating all diverse voices and forces of oversight.
In reality, “one country, two systems” never existed — it was merely a smokescreen to delay the world from witnessing the truth.
Elliot Yao is a reviewer.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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