Last month, two major diplomatic events unfolded in Southeast Asia that suggested subtle shifts in the region’s strategic landscape. The 46th ASEAN Summit and the inaugural ASEAN-Gulf-Cooperation Council (GCC)-China Trilateral Summit in Kuala Lumpur coincided with French President Emmanuel Macron’s high-profile visits to Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore. Together, they highlighted ASEAN’s maturing global posture, deepening regional integration and China’s intensifying efforts to recalibrate its economic diplomacy amid uncertainties posed by the US.
The ASEAN summit took place amid rising protectionist policies from the US, notably sweeping tariffs on goods from Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, with duties as high as 49 percent. ASEAN’s response — eschewing retaliation in favor of dialogue — demonstrated its commitment to multilateralism and strategic autonomy. Rather than aligning itself fully with any major power, ASEAN is building a diversified network of partnerships to enhance resilience and reduce dependency on a single hegemon.
That provided fertile ground for China’s diplomatic and economic overtures. Chinese Premier Li Qiang (李強) led China’s delegation, emphasizing its prioritization of Southeast Asia and Gulf states as critical partners in a world marked by geopolitical realignment and economic decoupling.
China’s newly announced ASEAN visa policy — unveiled on Tuesday last week — exemplifies its commitment to deepening people-to-people and business exchanges. Targeted at entrepreneurs and businesspeople from ASEAN members, including observer member Timor-Leste, the visa aims to facilitate smoother mobility, trust-building and trade.
China’s deeper engagement is not merely opportunistic, but increasingly essential. Confronted by slowing domestic growth, youth unemployment and demographic contraction, Beijing sees regional partnerships as crucial buffers. The ASEAN and GCC economies offer growing consumer markets, energy partnerships and trade potential — vital ingredients for China’s economic stability amid its rocky relationship with the US.
The trilateral summit emphasized several key themes: supply chain diversification, energy transition, regional payment systems and digital connectivity. Notably, the formation of a regional business council and the endorsement of “high-quality” Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects align with ASEAN’s infrastructure needs and China’s goal to rebrand the BRI as sustainable and multilateral.
One significant initiative was a proposal to explore the inclusion of GCC countries into the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. ASEAN’s willingness to conduct feasibility studies shows a strategic interest in knitting the Gulf states more tightly into Asia’s economic fabric. That is complemented by the completed negotiations for the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area 3.0 upgrade, expected to be formalized later this year.
China is also strategically investing in alternatives to Western-dominated systems. Beyond physical infrastructure, efforts to expand the yuan’s role in regional trade, support local currency settlements and develop cross-border digital payment platforms signal China’s intent to reshape the rules of economic engagement across the Eurasian landmass. The effort seeks not just influence, but insulation from Western coercion.
Running parallel to the summits, Macron’s diplomatic tour of Southeast Asia reinforced France’s growing interest in the Indo-Pacific region. His visits to Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore demonstrated France’s willingness to act as an “adjunct power” in a region increasingly defined by US-China rivalry.
Macron’s keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue warned against ignoring conflicts such as the war in Ukraine, linking them to Indo-Pacific stability. He called for strategic autonomy and multilateralism — ideas that resonate strongly with ASEAN members wary of great power entanglements.
France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, rooted in maritime security, sustainability and adherence to international law, positions Paris as a like-minded partner for countries seeking balance without confrontation.
Unlike China’s state-driven, infrastructure-heavy initiatives, France promotes a governance-oriented, value-based approach. Macron’s emphasis on sovereignty, navigation freedoms and respect for international norms appealed to nations eager to maintain independence, while benefiting from diversified engagement.
What emerges from such developments is a Southeast Asia that is increasingly looking to shape, rather than simply react to, the global order. ASEAN’s evolving diplomacy reflects greater strategic maturity. It is simultaneously drawing China closer, exploring economic complementarities with the Gulf and welcoming European engagement, without choosing sides.
The GCC’s presence in the trilateral summit added further complexity to that realignment. GCC nations, traditionally oriented toward the West, are diversifying their foreign relations and looking East, not just for energy exports, but also for technology partnerships, investments and markets. China’s inclusion as a common partner underscores its bridging role in that triangular dynamic.
Yet, China’s influence, while expanding, is not without limits. There remains skepticism among ASEAN and Gulf states about overdependence, debt risks and potential political strings attached to Chinese projects. While China’s capital and infrastructure are welcome, they are weighed against long-term concerns around transparency, governance and sovereignty.
Beijing must demonstrate that it can evolve from a transactional power to a trustworthy, long-term partner.
The ASEAN-GCC-China Summit and Macron’s Southeast Asia tour were more than symbolic — they marked a strategic inflection point. For ASEAN, the events crystallized its transformation from a reactive bloc to a proactive actor capable of managing complex relationships. For China, the meetings highlighted opportunities and constraints: Southeast Asia and the Gulf offer pathways to offset US headwinds, but only if Beijing can offer credible assurances of mutual benefit and political respect.
China’s regional push reflects a fundamental truth: In an increasingly fragmented global economy, scale, proximity and pragmatism matter more than ideology. As the US pursues more protectionist policies and internal political uncertainty continues, China is positioning itself as a source of policy continuity, economic liquidity and infrastructure capability.
However, China’s success would depend less on its ability to provide capital and more on how it listens, adapts and builds genuine consensus.
As ASEAN moves toward its Vision 2045, and as global power centers continue to shift, such summits might well be remembered as pivotal steps in constructing a new model of economic diplomacy — one that favors balance over alignment, resilience over dependence and collaboration over confrontation.
Gurjit Singh is a former Indian ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, ASEAN, Ethiopia and the African Union.
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