Xiaomi Corp founder Lei Jun (雷軍) on May 22 made a high-profile announcement, giving online viewers a sneak peek at the company’s first 3-nanometer mobile processor — the Xring O1 chip — and saying it is a breakthrough in China’s chip design history.
Although Xiaomi might be capable of designing chips, it lacks the ability to manufacture them.
No matter how beautifully planned the blueprints are, if they cannot be mass-produced, they are nothing more than drawings on paper.
The truth is that China’s chipmaking efforts are still heavily reliant on the free world — particularly on Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co’s (TSMC) manufacturing capabilities.
The 3-nanometer process is more than just a technical issue, it is a full-chain challenge encompassing materials, equipment and production workflows.
TSMC and Samsung are the only companies in the world capable of stably mass-producing 3-nanometer chips, with the former holding an overwhelming market advantage.
If Xiaomi’s so-called “independently developed” Xring O1’s fabrication requires outsourcing, its claim of autonomy is meaningless.
Whoever is willing to take on this task would effectively be aiding the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in establishing a false narrative of technological independence under the banner of chip nationalism, thereby putting themselves at risk of becoming entangled in geopolitical and trade tensions.
Given the escalating US-China technological and trade tensions, helping Chinese firms mass-produce advanced chips would inevitably conflict with US tariffs and sanctions mechanisms.
US President Donald Trump imposed high tariffs on high-tech products tied to China’s supply chain, and any products associated with the CCP’s “military-civil fusion” are considered strategic risks.
If TSMC were to manufacture chips designed by China, the US would likely regard the move as indirectly supporting Chinese strategic technologies.
This would give the US ample reason to exert pressure, impose sanctions or even cut off critical parts of TSMC’s supply chain.
The announcement of Xiaomi’s Xring O1 chip was a political publicity stunt.
It serves to gloss over the CCP’s narrative of being a technological superpower and attempts to use private enterprise to repackage the soft power of national strategy.
In reality, it is merely labeling design achievements as “independent,” only to outsource manufacturing to overseas foundries and reimport the finished products to be sold in the domestic market.
Under this framework, it would be impossible for China to escape this bottleneck in advanced chip manufacturing, let alone achieve true strategic autonomy.
Elliot Yao is a reviewer.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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