On April 22, terrorists killed 25 Indian civilians and one Nepali national in Indian-administered Kashmir. The Resistance Front (TRF), an alleged proxy of the Pakistan-based group Lashkar-e-Taiba, initially claimed responsibility before quickly retracting the statement. When India sought to name the group in a UN Security Council statement, China blocked the move, thereby weakening international condemnation. While Beijing called for an “impartial investigation,” its actions effectively shielded Pakistan — revealing a strategic tilt.
India responded on May 7 with Operation Sindoor, a series of precise strikes on terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs labeled the strikes “regrettable” — a carefully measured term reflecting Beijing’s deeper dilemma: balancing its rhetoric on counterterrorism with unwavering support for Pakistan.
By criticizing India’s response while remaining silent on the massacre that triggered it, China demonstrated the asymmetry in its supposed neutrality. This was not just diplomatic fence-sitting; it was a missed opportunity for leadership and moral clarity. The decision to obstruct condemnation of a terror attack undermines China’s credibility, especially for a nation seeking influence as a leader of the Global South and a peace-broker.
To understand China’s position, one must look beyond official statements to the strategic cues. While publicly calling for calm, Chinese diplomats privately reassured Pakistan. Chinese media underplayed the Pahalgam killings and leaned heavily into Pakistani narratives, reporting alleged civilian casualties from Indian strikes, while casting Islamabad as the aggrieved party. The result was not neutrality, but narrative manipulation.
China’s reaction was driven by strategic calculations: protect the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), shield a long-time ally, and deflect regional backlash. But this response has consequences. It risks stalling the fragile thaw in Sino-Indian ties, visible in diplomatic exchanges following the border agreement reached last year after the deadly Galwan Valley clashes in 2020.
Meanwhile, India has stuck to a diplomatic path. Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval briefed his counterparts across key capitals, including Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅). Yet Beijing’s broader messaging leaned heavily toward Islamabad. On platforms such as Sina Weibo, misinformation proliferated — claims of Indian jet losses, alleged Indus Waters Treaty contraventions and even fictional Indian prisoners of war. The aim was clear: discredit India and bolster Pakistan’s victim narrative.
Chinese commentators also questioned India’s military capability, citing outdated references to the 2019 Balakot strike and suggesting that India’s assertiveness stemmed from internal instability. Some drew parallels between India’s actions on the Line of Control with Pakistan and its posture along the Line of Actual Control with China, reinforcing long-standing strategic distrust.
This distrust runs deeper. By targeting terror hubs in areas such as Pakistan’s Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces, regions plagued by separatist and jihadist violence that often threaten Chinese interests, India signaled a readiness to raise the cost of proxy terrorism. With the CPEC running through these volatile zones, Beijing’s indulgence of Pakistan’s duplicity appears increasingly short-sighted. There is also the risk of ideological spillover into Xinjiang, adding another layer to China’s anxieties.
Internationally, India’s actions drew broad support. Leaders from the US, France, Israel and the UK expressed solidarity after the Pahalgam killings.
In contrast, China’s silence was conspicuous.
Chinese state media amplified Pakistani narratives, revealing a calculated duality: maintaining diplomatic restraint outwardly, while reinforcing pro-Pakistan sentiment at home.
India responded by excluding China from an Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefing on the operation — a subtle diplomatic rebuke. Beijing’s inconsistent stance has created space for India to present itself as a more reliable counterterror partner to global stakeholders, including those re-evaluating ties in Asia.
The CPEC project remains the clearest example of China’s conflicted priorities. It runs not only through disputed territory in Kashmir, but also areas increasingly targeted by militancy. By refusing to condemn terrorism when it implicates Pakistan, China risks material investments and geopolitical capital.
Had Beijing chosen a different path — unequivocally condemning terrorism, moderating its public support for Pakistan and fostering the slow warmth of rebuilding ties with India — it might have strengthened its regional standing. Instead, by choosing hedging over honesty, it missed a rare moment to lead with principle.
The India-China thaw needed a catalyst that went beyond economic rationale. China lost this chance to stand with India and the world against terrorism, which would have provided it a good engagement lever with India to build a renewed partnership.
Gurjit Singh is a former Indian ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, ASEAN, Ethiopia and the African Union.
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