On Tuesday, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command initiated joint army, navy, air and rocket force exercises around Taiwan. The exercises focused on combat readiness patrols at sea and in the air, seizing comprehensive control, striking maritime and land targets, and imposing a blockade. The level and scope of the drills — designed to test the joint operational capabilities of the theater’s forces — is notably higher than China’s previous joint combat readiness patrols.
US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently met with Japanese Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani in Tokyo, where he emphasized the importance of achieving “credible” deterrence across the Taiwan Strait through greater cooperation with regional allies. China’s large-scale military exercises surrounding Taiwan just after this meeting hold the strategic implication of testing the US’ bottom line with regard to the Taiwan Strait.
A memo from the US Department of Defense recently disclosed by the media directly mentioned the goal of countering China. Additionally, leaked group chats regarding planned airstrikes in Yemen suggest that US President Donald Trump is much less reluctant to use military force than former US president Joe Biden. How would the US respond to direct challenges to security in the Taiwan Strait?
Ahead of a potential meeting between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), Beijing wants a clear picture of the US’ strategic bottom line — this is likely part of China’s diplomatic strategy.
This week’s exercises indicate that the PLA is seeking a new exercise model that goes beyond its previous joint combat readiness patrols and specialized “Joint Sword” drills. While the “Joint Sword” exercises were originally meant as a response to statements by President William Lai (賴清德) regarding cross-strait issues, the PLA is now looking for a new format to avoid giving rise to excessive international alarm.
From an operational perspective, “Joint Sword” drills are operations involving the army, navy, air force and rocket force, while joint combat readiness patrols primarily involve the air force and navy. Compared with joint combat readiness patrols, this model demonstrates qualitative and quantitative changes in terms of the scale of forces deployed, and coordination between the military and the coast guard — it could be a new form of deterrence aimed at Taiwan.
As Sun Zi’s (孫子) The Art of War (孫子兵法) states: “Rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.”
The threats posed by China’s exercises reiterate the importance of combat readiness. China has significantly reduced its preparation time between military exercises. Its previous joint combat readiness patrols might have been an initial troop mobilization phase to prepare for subsequent exercises, and the movement of aircraft carriers this time around is a clear indication that these military exercises were large-scale. Furthermore, the possibility of the PLA incorporating aircraft carriers to increase the scale of subsequent “Joint Sword” exercises cannot be ruled out.
These are all factors requiring close attention. The lowered response time for military exercises highlights the importance of the Ministry of National Defense’s “immediate combat readiness drills” last month, combined with whole-of-society resilience drills and regulatory revisions.
Only when the government, military and civilians are adequately prepared can Taiwan respond to China’s numerous and multifaceted threats.
Lin Ying-yu is an assistant professor at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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