Iwasaki Shigeru, former chief of staff of the joint staff of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), has been appointed as a political consultant for a one-year renewable term by the Executive Yuan. For the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-led administration, he might serve as an additional informal communication channel with the Japanese defense policy circle.
Japanese and Taiwanese mainstream media emphatically reported that news, evoking an image of the Japanese White Group among the Taiwanese public. It was a secret voluntary military advisory group from 1949 to 1969, which primarily consisted of about 80 former generals and high-ranking officers from the Imperial Japanese Army. At the request of then-president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), it played a critical role in enhancing command and operational capacities to survive the first and second Taiwan Strait Crisis, and a possible Chinese invasion.
Growing expectations for Iwasaki is understandable, as Taiwan is at a political impasse, given its divided government. It is unable to pass even a necessary defense budget bill for the reinforcement of defense capabilities. However, the consultant position is low-profile, honorary or, at most, for specific policy issues. Japanese national and restaurant owner Nozaki Takao was the first adviser appointed for international exchange.
Of course, the Executive Yuan could consult Iwasaki about larger strategic issues when necessary, or as frequently as possible online, even though he resides in Japan. The ministers of defense and foreign affairs could be formally connected to him, too.
Yet, under the Constitution, the president is responsible for and has the prerogative in national strategy and basic policy implementation, and is advised and assisted by the National Security Council. Less than three dozen senior advisers, fewer than 90 national policy advisers and only 15 military strategy advisers selected from Taiwanese. They are high-profile figures, and although usually honorary, they have possible direct access to the president for important foreign and security policy questions, in contrast with political consultants at the Executive Yuan.
Given the difference, Iwasaki would plausibly be consulted about specific defense and military issues he is knowledgeable about, given his long and extensive military career that ended with him holding the highest SDF military position, such as total coordination of military and civil defense, and management of overburdened fighter jets scrambling against Chinese military aircraft.
However, even with the stringent informal framework of bilateral relations, Japan has already made great progress in communicating matters with Taiwanese authorities by regularly dispatching a retired SDF major-general and one official from the Japanese Ministry of Defense to the de facto Japanese embassy in Taipei. They serve as good contacts and sources for their Taiwanese counterparts.
Moreover, bilateral civil exchange has significantly improved through many conferences, seminars and workshops on foreign and military policies organized by Taiwanese non-government think tanks and university-affiliated research centers, such National Chengchi University Institute of International Relations and Tamkang University College of International Affairs, with their Japanese counterparts. The events give ample opportunities for second-truck (or informal) diplomacy, with current or former government officials being able to participate as private individuals, meticulous academic policy research and discussion, and overall intellectual exchange.
The political consultant status is by no means essential. Iwasaki and two retired Ground SDF generals delivered three different lectures on Japan and East Asian security at Tamkang University in May last year. He could simply continue that approach.
To manage politically sensitive relations with China, it is important to avoid unnecessarily provoking Beijing by highlighting Japanese military involvement in Taiwan‘s national defense. A Chinese ministry of foreign affairs spokesperson showed strong displeasure and officially made a statement against Iwasaki’s appointment.
The diplomatic cost of Iwasaki’s appointment seems to exceed benefits, amid already precarious cross-strait stability. Certainly, his appointment does not have to be secret, because, unlike the White Group, it has nothing to do with military operations or intelligence activities. It only involves regular public policy matters that would be known to the public sooner or later. Thus, the appointment itself was questionable as similar policy effects could be attained without it.
The rationale of Iwasaki’s appointment is only to retain, or if lucky, raise, public support for the administration of President William Lai (賴清德) and the DPP.
The administration is mired by a divided government, with limited room in which to maneuver, while facing mixed signals and pressures from US President Donald Trump’s administration and greater uncertainty about the US’ commitment to Taiwan’s defense. Naturally, Taiwanese might look to Japan for help. Nonetheless, the Lai administration should stick to the basics and adopt a prudent policy, rather than a forced error.
Masahiro Matsumura is professor of international politics and national security at St Andrew’s University in Osaka, Japan.
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