When President William Lai (賴清德) assumed office in May last year, questions arose about the future of former president Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) signature foreign policy, the New Southbound Policy (NSP). While Lai pledged to continue the NSP during his campaign, his administration has sent mixed signals, particularly as the opposition-controlled legislature slashes government budgets across the board. The one-year postponement of the Yushan Forum — the nation’s annual regional dialogue that has long served as a cornerstone of NSP outreach — only deepened concerns about the government’s commitment to the policy.
However, Lai addressed these doubts during his speech at this year’s forum. He highlighted the achievements of the original NSP and laid out his administration’s vision for the New Southbound Policy Plus (NSP+), a revamped approach that not only continues engagement with partners in South and Southeast Asia, but also broadens its scope to the wider Indo-Pacific region. Lai does not just intend to maintain the NSP; he plans to expand its scale and hence its strategic relevance on the global stage.
Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation chairman Michael Hsiao (蕭新煌) explained that the NSP+ would focus on six strategic “corridors.” These include three government-led initiatives, namely the “technology,” the “health” and the “resilience” corridors. Civil society would drive the other three, namely the “think tank,” the “non-governmental [NGO] organization,” and the “youth” corridors.
These corridor strategies mark a notable shift from the original NSP. Under Tsai, the NSP functioned primarily as an instrument of economic statecraft, aimed at reducing Taiwan’s economic dependence on China, while fostering closer ties with partner countries in the region.
Lai’s NSP+ not only deepens engagement, but positions Taiwan as a regional hub for partners and like-minded countries to cooperate through the new corridors.
The groundwork to establish these corridors was already being laid during Tsai’s presidency: Taiwan and the Philippines conducted multiple joint training for firefighters, an early example of the resilience corridor; the Taiwan Alliance in International Development offered fellowships that brought NGO professionals from partner countries to Taiwan, which might be a look into the NGO corridor; and in the health sector, Taiwan implemented a “One Country, One Center” initiative to deepen medical cooperation and provide capacity for partner countries. In addition, Taiwan has implemented programs inviting youth leaders from partner countries to Taiwan for exchange and leadership training.
These efforts are just a few examples of initiatives that already align with the new corridor strategies. The real challenge lies in how to effectively integrate these programs into a cohesive NSP+ framework.
The term “corridor” typically denotes a passageway from A to B. In the context of the NSP+, it could be reimagined as a “bridge,” not just linking Taiwan with its partner countries, but also fostering cooperation among the partners themselves. Taiwan would serve as a hub to facilitate meaningful, multilateral collaboration across the region.
However, there are challenges. First, Taiwan’s ambition to act as a hub might be limited by diplomatic isolation. While the original NSP made meaningful strides in strengthening people-to-people ties, Taiwan still struggles with limited diplomatic recognition on the global stage. Since Tsai took office, multiple former allies have cut ties with Taipei.
Second, Taiwan faces steep competition. In many Southeast Asian countries, China maintains a strong presence, not only through government engagement, but also as a major source of funding for local NGOs and think tanks. This financial influence could create hesitation to build closer ties with Taiwan, especially when doing so might risk jeopardizing relationships with Chinese counterparts or donors.
Patrick Kurniawan is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan fellow at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, National Chengchi University; and science and technology fellow at the Center for Business and Diplomatic Studies, Binus University.
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