When President William Lai (賴清德) assumed office in May last year, questions arose about the future of former president Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) signature foreign policy, the New Southbound Policy (NSP). While Lai pledged to continue the NSP during his campaign, his administration has sent mixed signals, particularly as the opposition-controlled legislature slashes government budgets across the board. The one-year postponement of the Yushan Forum — the nation’s annual regional dialogue that has long served as a cornerstone of NSP outreach — only deepened concerns about the government’s commitment to the policy.
However, Lai addressed these doubts during his speech at this year’s forum. He highlighted the achievements of the original NSP and laid out his administration’s vision for the New Southbound Policy Plus (NSP+), a revamped approach that not only continues engagement with partners in South and Southeast Asia, but also broadens its scope to the wider Indo-Pacific region. Lai does not just intend to maintain the NSP; he plans to expand its scale and hence its strategic relevance on the global stage.
Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation chairman Michael Hsiao (蕭新煌) explained that the NSP+ would focus on six strategic “corridors.” These include three government-led initiatives, namely the “technology,” the “health” and the “resilience” corridors. Civil society would drive the other three, namely the “think tank,” the “non-governmental [NGO] organization,” and the “youth” corridors.
These corridor strategies mark a notable shift from the original NSP. Under Tsai, the NSP functioned primarily as an instrument of economic statecraft, aimed at reducing Taiwan’s economic dependence on China, while fostering closer ties with partner countries in the region.
Lai’s NSP+ not only deepens engagement, but positions Taiwan as a regional hub for partners and like-minded countries to cooperate through the new corridors.
The groundwork to establish these corridors was already being laid during Tsai’s presidency: Taiwan and the Philippines conducted multiple joint training for firefighters, an early example of the resilience corridor; the Taiwan Alliance in International Development offered fellowships that brought NGO professionals from partner countries to Taiwan, which might be a look into the NGO corridor; and in the health sector, Taiwan implemented a “One Country, One Center” initiative to deepen medical cooperation and provide capacity for partner countries. In addition, Taiwan has implemented programs inviting youth leaders from partner countries to Taiwan for exchange and leadership training.
These efforts are just a few examples of initiatives that already align with the new corridor strategies. The real challenge lies in how to effectively integrate these programs into a cohesive NSP+ framework.
The term “corridor” typically denotes a passageway from A to B. In the context of the NSP+, it could be reimagined as a “bridge,” not just linking Taiwan with its partner countries, but also fostering cooperation among the partners themselves. Taiwan would serve as a hub to facilitate meaningful, multilateral collaboration across the region.
However, there are challenges. First, Taiwan’s ambition to act as a hub might be limited by diplomatic isolation. While the original NSP made meaningful strides in strengthening people-to-people ties, Taiwan still struggles with limited diplomatic recognition on the global stage. Since Tsai took office, multiple former allies have cut ties with Taipei.
Second, Taiwan faces steep competition. In many Southeast Asian countries, China maintains a strong presence, not only through government engagement, but also as a major source of funding for local NGOs and think tanks. This financial influence could create hesitation to build closer ties with Taiwan, especially when doing so might risk jeopardizing relationships with Chinese counterparts or donors.
Patrick Kurniawan is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan fellow at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, National Chengchi University; and science and technology fellow at the Center for Business and Diplomatic Studies, Binus University.
The Chinese government on March 29 sent shock waves through the Tibetan Buddhist community by announcing the untimely death of one of its most revered spiritual figures, Hungkar Dorje Rinpoche. His sudden passing in Vietnam raised widespread suspicion and concern among his followers, who demanded an investigation. International human rights organization Human Rights Watch joined their call and urged a thorough investigation into his death, highlighting the potential involvement of the Chinese government. At just 56 years old, Rinpoche was influential not only as a spiritual leader, but also for his steadfast efforts to preserve and promote Tibetan identity and cultural
Former minister of culture Lung Ying-tai (龍應台) has long wielded influence through the power of words. Her articles once served as a moral compass for a society in transition. However, as her April 1 guest article in the New York Times, “The Clock Is Ticking for Taiwan,” makes all too clear, even celebrated prose can mislead when romanticism clouds political judgement. Lung crafts a narrative that is less an analysis of Taiwan’s geopolitical reality than an exercise in wistful nostalgia. As political scientists and international relations academics, we believe it is crucial to correct the misconceptions embedded in her article,
Strategic thinker Carl von Clausewitz has said that “war is politics by other means,” while investment guru Warren Buffett has said that “tariffs are an act of war.” Both aphorisms apply to China, which has long been engaged in a multifront political, economic and informational war against the US and the rest of the West. Kinetically also, China has launched the early stages of actual global conflict with its threats and aggressive moves against Taiwan, the Philippines and Japan, and its support for North Korea’s reckless actions against South Korea that could reignite the Korean War. Former US presidents Barack Obama
The pan-blue camp in the era after the rule of the two Chiangs — former presidents Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) — can be roughly divided into two main factions: the “true blue,” who insist on opposing communism to protect the Republic of China (ROC), and the “red-blue,” who completely reject the current government and would rather collude with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to control Taiwan. The families of the former group suffered brutally under the hands of communist thugs in China. They know the CPP well and harbor a deep hatred for it — the two
RSS