Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) start-up DeepSeek early this year launched a new model to much fanfare internationally, but the company’s technological breakthroughs did not come from independent research and development, they relied on the technological achievements accumulated by the US and other Western countries.
As early as 2017, the Chinese government proposed a plan for a “new generation of AI,” with the goal of becoming a global leader in the technology by 2030. This is not only about tech competition, but also an important step for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to achieve “digital totalitarianism.”
Chinese companies use AI to monitor the nation’s people and bolster censorship at home. They promote Chinese-made AI technology abroad through large-scale subsidies and low bidding, coercing developing countries into dependence on Chinese technology and expanding the CCP’s digital authoritarian influence.
Last year, the CCP proposed a global AI governance initiative to promote its censorship system and surveillance technology internationally in the name of “responsible AI,” which is tantamount to asking the world to accept an AI version of its social credit system.
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Guo Jiakun (郭嘉昆) has said that China is willing to cooperate with other countries to develop AI and help developing countries benefit from “the intelligence dividend,” but such support often comes with control over data and monopoly of infrastructure.
Under Beijing’s Digital Silk Road initiative, Chinese companies provide AI technology and surveillance systems in Africa and Southeast Asia, but transmit local data back to China and use technical barriers to tie the countries into China’s digital ecosystem, endangering national security and tying recipient countries to Beijing.
Nations should be wary of China’s use of AI technology to expand its authoritarian influence. They should bolster protections of intellectual property to prevent technological innovators from being defeated by China’s theft and subsidy strategies.
Ryan Xu is a freelancer.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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