Regarding the Ukraine issue, US President Donald Trump bypassing Europe and shifting toward Russia is altering the international order.
The EU and NATO have been stunned by their sudden weakening. Even if Trump were to force Ukraine and Russia into reaching some kind of peace agreement to shift military attention to the Indo-Pacific region and counter China, many still would not help but question whether Trump’s “Make America Great Again” policy exists to serve only US interests, unable to distinguish friend from foe.
The world is changing dramatically. While Taiwan’s situation seems concerning, there are opportunities available. The question is: How should we seize them?
First, the EU — an economic giant and political dwarf — has entered an “era of rearmament.” Following World War II, the US, fearing the spread of communism, allowed European countries to prosper under the Marshall Plan and the US’ defense umbrella. After the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia was also a cause for US concern, but EU states felt no need to invest in defense spending under US protection.
However, with Trump 2.0 now pro-Russia, the EU is forced to confront its military deficiencies. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed allowing member states to increase defense expenditures without triggering the Excessive Deficit Procedure — effectively loosening deficit limits — and last year said the bloc needs 500 billion euros (US$543.25 billion) in defense investments over the next decade.
Germany has also made a significant policy shift, with German Christian Democratic Union leader and chancellor-elect Friedrich Merz proposing amendments that would allow for defense spending above 1 percent of GDP to be exempted from constitutional restrictions, in addition to establishing a special infrastructure fund worth hundreds of billions of euros. Meanwhile, the UK and France are organizing a “coalition of the willing” to support Ukraine.
Europe is aware that the good days are over. There are two main benefits to the EU’s rearmament. One is the increased possibility of European military autonomy, as long advocated by France. Although the EU does not possess an independent military, the defense capabilities of its member states are sure to improve significantly. And two is that EU member states’ military presence in the Indo-Pacific region could act as a deterrent force.
Second, Trump abruptly withdrew military aid from Ukraine and aligned with Russia — the US even went so far as to vote against a European resolution supporting Ukraine at the UN General Assembly, alerting Beijing. As a result, Russia and China have begun to rekindle their relationship, declaring that their friendship is “limitless.” Trump’s pro-Russia stance means that Moscow no longer needs to depend entirely on China: Because of this, Beijing might no longer be able to sell favors in exchange for cheap energy while simultaneously guarding against US attempts to drive a wedge between the Russia-China relationship.
Russia’s willingness to include Iran’s nuclear program in future discussions with the US is its way of returning Washington’s goodwill. That US-Russia rapprochement might also indirectly weaken Russia’s alliance with North Korea. Relations between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are beginning to fragment. While Beijing might secretly enjoy that Trump has offended all of the US’ allies, it must remain cautious — the US pulling Russia closer could disrupt China’s goals for BRICS and the global south.
Lastly, although the US is at odds with Ukraine, it has not neglected the Asia-Pacific region. The US and Japan are still holding joint military exercises, with US warships arriving in South Korea on Sunday. Worried the US might relax its control, Japan last month sent an Akizuki-class destroyer on its first-ever solo transit through the Taiwan Strait before participating in a joint exercise with the US, Australia and Philippines in the South China Sea. The Indo-Pacific region and the Taiwan Strait remain focus points for the US and Japan.
While the relationship between the US, Europe and Ukraine is deteriorating, and Taiwan appears to be at a disadvantage, we also see the EU rearming itself, with rapprochement between the US and Russia beginning to restrain China, North Korea and Iran.
Taiwan must follow the correct path by aligning with Trump’s interests in semiconductor cooperation and securing ties with the EU, as it moves toward military autonomy and develops its own Indo-Pacific strategy. That would encourage the EU — which is increasing its defense and military expenditures — to send more warships to visit the Taiwan Strait.
Chang Meng-jen is chair of Fu Jen Catholic University’s Department of Italian Language and Culture and coordinator of the university’s diplomacy and international affairs program.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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