An archipelago of 15 islands in the Polynesian region of the Pacific Ocean, the Cook Islands has found itself at the center of geopolitical competition. Its recent decision to sign an action plan for a “comprehensive strategic partnership 2025-2030” with China has sparked controversy not just domestically, but also across the broader Pacific region.
Given its location between American Samoa, a US territory, and French Polynesia, the Cook Islands holds strategic importance, making its foreign policy choices significant. This deal raises key questions: Is it a purely economic arrangement, as China claims, or does it carry deep and long-term strategic implications?
As a self-governing state in “free association” with New Zealand, the Cook Islands has historically relied on Wellington for foreign affairs, defense and security assistance — although these obligations are not legally binding. The fact that New Zealand was not consulted before the islands signed the China deal has led to diplomatic tensions.
Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown has said the agreement focuses on economic cooperation, particularly seabed mining, education and disaster relief, rather than security. However, this assurance has done little to quell concerns in Wellington and beyond.
China’s growing influence in the Pacific region is not new. In 2023, it signed a secretive security agreement with the Solomon Islands, which leaked reports said included provisions for Chinese law enforcement assistance. While the Cook Islands’ deal does not explicitly involve security cooperation, critics fear it could pave the way for deeper strategic entanglements in the future.
The deal includes a one-time grant of US$4 million from China, reinforcing the perception that Beijing is leveraging economic incentives to expand its regional influence. This is particularly worrying for New Zealand, which is walking extra miles to engage countries of the region through its Pacific Reset Initiative.
One of the most contentious aspects of the deal is deep-sea mining. Climate change remains the most existential threat to Pacific Island nations, yet the Cook Islands government is exploring seabed mining, particularly of nodules rich in metals such as nickel and cobalt, a move that has alarmed environmental groups and regional neighbors.
The Melanesian Spearhead Group has advocated a moratorium on deep-sea mining, given the uncertain ecological consequences. Nauru, despite experiencing phosphate mining’s devastating impact, has supported sustainable seabed mining efforts, highlighting the dilemma faced by resource-scarce island nations.
The paradox is evident: While deep-sea minerals are crucial for clean energy technologies and global decarbonization, the environmental costs of extraction remain unknown. Major financial institutions and corporations have distanced themselves from deep-sea mining, further signaling the risks involved. For a nation highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, the Cook Islands must weigh short-term economic benefits against long-term environmental consequences.
New Zealand and Australia have ramped up diplomatic efforts to counterbalance China’s presence in the Pacific. While it is not clear how the US President Donald Trump administration would respond to China’s deepening presence in the region, former US president Joe Biden’s administration did reinforce its Pacific strategy and in September 2023 hosted regional leaders in Washington to reaffirm US commitment to security and economic development in the area.
As the geopolitical contest intensifies, smaller Pacific nations like the Cook Islands must navigate their relationships carefully to avoid becoming pawns in a great-power rivalry. The Cook Islands’ opposition party has called for a no-confidence vote against Brown, reflecting domestic unease over the China deal. Protests continue, with critics urging the government to uphold transparency and prioritize national sovereignty.
With global eyes on the Pacific region, the Cook Islands’ next steps would not only shape its own future, but could also redefine regional power dynamics. Transparency and accountability must remain at the heart of any international engagement. As the world watches, the Cook Islands faces a crucial test: balancing economic development with environmental responsibility and geopolitical stability. If current upheavals damage its long-standing ties with New Zealand, the deal with China would do more harm than the perceived gains.
Rahul Mishra is a senior research fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, Thammasat University, Thailand. Shubhamitra Das is an associate professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
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