The Ministry of Education last week blacklisted two Chinese schools that are affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) United Front Work Department (UFWD), banning educational institutions from having exchanges or collaborating with them, and no longer recognizing qualifications from those schools.
The three schools in China are Huaqiao University in Xiamen and Quanzhou, Jinan University in Guangzhou and the Beijing Chinese Language and Culture College. There are reportedly no Taiwanese studying at the Beijing Chinese Language and Culture College, but about 1,500 Taiwanese are enrolled in Jinan University and about 600 at Huaqiao University, and qualifications issued by Jinan University were previously recognized in Taiwan.
The ministry said since the schools became affiliated with the UFWD, their guidelines, management and curriculum might have strayed from those of internationally recognized academic universities. The schools were also reported to have “extremely low standards” for Taiwanese applicants, and offered scholarships and tuition waivers as incentives to attract more Taiwanese students.
Taiwanese rapper Chen Po-yuan (陳柏源) said he had attended Huaqiao University, where they were taught “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” “Xi Jinping [習近平] Thought,” “US skepticism,” and CCP loyalty and nationalism. He added that the university hoped the students would conduct “united front” work when they return to Taiwan after graduation.
The policy aroused criticism from opposition parties, but it was not highly controversial and did not stir much debate. However, it does highlight “united front” work aimed at influencing the perceptions of Taiwanese (particularly younger people) about China through “softer” powers, such as education, culture, entertainment and tourism.
Following the Sunflower movement in 2014 and China’s brutal repression of Hong Kong protests since 2019, Taiwanese millennials were dubbed the “naturally independent” generation, who identify as “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese” and see Taiwan as an independent country. That was a setback for Xi’s “Chinese Dream,” which promised the “reunification” of Taiwan and China. That setback might have led the CCP to reassess its tactics. China ramped up its economic coercion and military intimidation, including ending preferential tariffs for Taiwanese imports, and increasing military drills and flybys around Taiwan. Last year it also issued 22 guidelines to punish “die-hard Taiwanese independence separatists,” while disinformation campaigns never stopped.
The CCP is also enticing Taiwanese students with low-cost summer or winter camps in China, sponsoring Taiwanese influencers to visit China and create pro-China content, recruiting Taiwanese students to study in China using low eligibility requirements and subsidy incentives, and attracting users with content on social media. Those aim to reduce young people’s alertness to China’s authoritarian regime and aggression towards Taiwan.
The tactics seem to be working, as a survey suggested that compared with millennials, younger Taiwanese are more open and rational towards China, while another survey showed that fewer than 40 percent of young Taiwanese supported regulating Taiwanese influencers linked to pro-China unification efforts, indicating a low awareness of China’s threat.
With opposition lawmakers passing controversial bills and cutting national defense budgets, and low vigilance among young people, the government’s recent efforts, including blacklisting the universities, and President William Lai’s (賴清德) priority goal of reforming the national security legal framework and expanding the national security framework to China’s “united front” tactics, infiltration attempts and cognitive warfare seem more important than ever.
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