What transpires when two anchor nations of the Indo-Pacific region are caught in the throes of political uncertainty and upheaval? When Japan, the bedrock of regional security, wrestles to stay aligned with an ally whose commitments are increasingly transactional? When South Korea, mired in political turbulence, becomes susceptible to adversarial maneuvering? The ripple effects on the region’s fragile balance of power — and Taiwan’s precarious security — could be nothing short of seismic. The world stands on the brink of witnessing the fallout.
This time, Taiwan finds itself navigating a labyrinth of shifting power dynamics, not only between Beijing and Washington, but also entangling Tokyo and Seoul. The twin pillars of the US’ cornerstone alliances in Asia are under mounting strain, grappling with internal discord and external pressures. The region’s security architecture is drifting into a realm of “known unknowns,” where unpredictability looms large.
To be sure, stability has never been a constant in alliances; their trajectories naturally shift with changing administrations, emerging threats and evolving geopolitical priorities. Yet, the current challenge is not simply one of fluctuation — it is fundamentally structural.
A looming “deprioritization” of alliance management and an increasing “misalignment” of strategic goals between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul might become more pronounced now that US President Donald Trump has taken office. That tension extends beyond mere bilateral relationships, threatening the fragile trilateral unity that has reignited over the past four years, unraveling a critical pillar, and steering Asia toward a precarious and uncertain future.
The US-Japan alliance stands at a precarious crossroads. On one side, a transactional US president, driven by a zero-sum economic vision and short-term pragmatism; on the other, a politically weakened Japanese prime minister, tethered to the constraints of a fragile coalition government. The discord between these two leaders — shaped by starkly contrasting domestic power and divergent priorities — casts the alliance into a precarious balance at a critical juncture.
Should both nations relegate the partnership to the margins of their strategic agendas, the alliance risks unraveling into fragmented, ad hoc engagements. Even with the scaffolding of deep institutionalization and resilient bureaucratic mechanisms, such a diminished approach would slow its momentum and undermine its ability to address shared security challenges, particularly as China’s assertiveness reshapes the regional order.
A faltering, undernourished US-Japan alliance, led by uninspired leadership on both sides, would send shock waves far beyond bilateral relations, eroding the bedrock of the US security architecture in Asia, emboldening adversaries and unsettling allies across the region.
The cracks in the alliance run deeper when viewed through the prism of competing priorities: Trumpism, with its transactional focus prioritizing short-term gains over strategic alignment, and the approach of Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, championing Tokyo’s autonomy over shouldering greater regional security responsibilities. The divergent approaches are compounded by flash points such as trade imbalances and disputes over defense burden-sharing, further straining trust between the two allies.
Left unchecked, that drift toward incoherence and deprioritization between Washington and Tokyo could deliver a serious blow to the region’s security framework. For Taiwan, that evolving dynamic demands a critical reassessment of its security dependencies and a recalibration of its role in safeguarding stability in an increasingly unpredictable Indo-Pacific region.
South Korea’s domestic political dynamics add a layer of complexity to an already fragile regional equation. A progressive administration in Seoul could shift the nation’s foreign policy priorities, straining the US-South Korea alliance and handing Beijing a golden opportunity to exploit emerging fractures. For Trump, a Blue House counterpart less aligned with the White House’s approach to China and North Korea could turn an erstwhile ally into a strategic liability.
Compounding these challenges is South Korea’s economic fragility. Its overdependence on Chinese markets and the outsized influence of chaebols have left Seoul constrained, with limited room to maneuver economically or strategically. Without structural reforms to rein in the dominance of these corporate giants and foster a thriving ecosystem of small and medium-sized enterprises, South Korea risks stalling in its ambition to cement itself as a “global pivot state,” economically and diplomatically.
That evolving political and economic landscape complicates Seoul’s ability to fully address Korean Peninsula issues, let alone play a significant role in contributing to or even discussing a Taiwan contingency. For Taipei, it underscores a pressing reality: It must account for developments on the Korean Peninsula, North and South, in its preparations for potential conflict, as these dynamics could crucially shape its alliances and determine when adversaries might exploit the situation.
Adaptation must shape Taiwan’s course this year. Recent events drive home two critical truths: The fragile nature of the strategic landscape and the uncomfortable reality that partnerships, while not severed, can be frozen in place. In that context, Taiwan’s only assured path forward lies in a proactive and self-reliant approach to national defense. Autonomy is not a choice, but an uncompromising necessity; the island democracy must assert greater agency over its security, transitioning from a passive recipient to an active architect of its own defense.
However, internal discord threatens to derail that vital transformation. Escalating budgetary chaos and political friction between the executive and legislative branches have dulled the country’s ability to meet the demands of an increasingly volatile region. The stakes are too high, and the warning signs are too clear. While domestic divergence might be a prevailing and defining trend globally, Taiwan lacks the luxury to indulge in such division.
Cathy Fang is a contributor at the think tank US Taiwan Watch, and an analyst at PLA Tracker and Safe Space. She was a policy analyst at the Project 2049 Institute and served as legislative assistant at the Legislative Yuan.
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