“Integrated Diplomacy” (總和外交) is the guiding principle of Taiwan’s current foreign policy. It seeks to mobilize technology, capital and talent for global outreach, strengthening Taiwan’s international connections. However, without a robust information security mechanism, such efforts risk being reduced to superficial courtesy calls.
Security clearance serves as the “entrance examination results” for government agency personnel in sensitive positions, qualifying them to access sensitive information. Senior aides in the US Congress must also possess security clearance to assist lawmakers in handling classified budgets.
However, security clearance is not an automatic right or a blanket necessity for accessing sensitive information. Access is granted only when personnel meet both the clearance qualifications and the “need-to-know” criterion, which ensures that information is disclosed only to those with a legitimate need. Taiwan lacks a security clearance system, and the “need-to-know” principle is governed by the Classified National Security Information Protection Act (國家機密保護法施行細則), with criteria determined by individual agencies.
It is crucial to distinguish security clearance from pre-employment checks. Security clearance involves regular post-employment evaluations, ensuring ongoing eligibility to handle classified information. According to the National Security Bureau (NSB), about 1,000 national security-related positions undergo pre-employment checks. However, security clearance regulations vary across ministries, resulting in a fragmented and inconsistent system.
In April, seven classified documents — originating from Taiwan’s representative office in the US and the International Cooperation and Development Fund — were leaked. In October, the Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) ethics office suffered a major breach, exposing the personal information of the minister and chief of the general staff. Additionally, reports in September revealed that engineers at the private defense contractor Aerospace Industrial Development Corp had allegedly shared sensitive information about domestically produced advanced trainer jets and next-generation fighter aircraft on public social media platforms, and even removed classified files from company premises.
Without stringent security standards and proper security awareness among personnel handling sensitive information, the risk of leaks remains high. These breaches not only compromise national interests, but also erode public trust in the government.
From a legislative perspective, the absence of security clearance in the executive branch could result in the over-classification of non-sensitive budget items, inflating classified budgets and complicating oversight. For instance, classified foreign affairs expenditures in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ budget next year account for 6 percent, a six-year high. For the MND, classified budgets constitute 5.42 percent, while more than 80 percent of the NSB’s budget is classified — raising red flags in the Legislative Yuan’s Budget Center.
The US Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency oversees security clearance for federal personnel. Evaluations consider loyalty, financial stability, criminal records and even personal behaviors such as substance use. For example, recreational drug use in states where cannabis is legal could still disqualify applicants from federal positions.
Japan implemented security clearance in April under its economic security framework. A dedicated agency under the Japanese Cabinet Office manages clearances to strengthen collaboration with allies such as the Five Eyes and G7 countries.
Implementing a security clearance system is essential for Taiwan to secure international cooperation opportunities and enable private companies to join global defense supply chains. Taiwan’s integrated diplomacy strategy outlines a grid-like strategic framework that incorporates five trust-based industries and fosters issue-driven, cross-ministerial collaboration, which requires coordination among a wide array of stakeholders handling sensitive information. A unified security clearance system is fundamental for Taiwan’s continued integration into the global community.
Developing inter-ministerial coordination on security clearance would empower government agencies to engage in exchanges involving classified information with international partners, bolstering national security and diplomatic credibility. Additionally, security clearance-certified private enterprises could access global supply chains and negotiate new opportunities, further advancing Taiwan’s economic and trade diplomacy.
Chen Kuan-ting is a member of the Foreign and National Defense Committee at the Legislative Yuan representing Chiayi County Constituency 2. He was formerly the special assistant to DPP chairperson and former president Tsai Ing-wen, the CEO of Taiwan NextGen Foundation, a researcher in the National Security Council, and an adjunct lecturer at Tamkang University’s Department of Diplomacy and International Relations. Gahon Chiang is a congressional staff member in the office of Legislator Chen Kuan-ting, focusing on Taiwan’s foreign policy. He holds a graduate degree in international relations from National Taiwan University and also serves as the Youth Representative to the Taichung City Government.
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