Would China attack Taiwan during the American lame duck period? For months, there have been worries that Beijing would seek to take advantage of an American president slowed by age and a potentially chaotic transition to make a move on Taiwan. In the wake of an American election that ended without drama, that far-fetched scenario will likely prove purely hypothetical. But there is a crisis brewing elsewhere in Asia — one with which US president-elect Donald Trump may have to deal during his first days in office.
Tensions between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea have been at a constant simmer over the last year. Beijing reacted poorly to the election of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., to the Philippine presidency in 2022, as Marcos wasted little time in defending his country’s rights in the South China Sea and in drawing closer to the United States.
After six years of dealing with a far more pliable Rodrigo Duterte, Beijing could not accept the Philippines’ insouciance. Indeed, China espied an opportunity to show resistance to be futile and to prove the United States to be an unreliable ally. Chinese maritime forces have been hard at work making life miserable for their Philippine counterparts. Through it all, Philippine sailors have had their cameras rolling, putting the David-and-Goliath contest on film for all to see.
The Biden administration has consistently leant rhetorical support to Manila as Marcos stares down Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), while also taking concrete steps to strengthen the US-Philippines alliance. Biden hosted the first-ever trilateral summit with the leaders of Japan and the Philippines, announced a major infrastructure project in the Philippines following that country’s withdrawal from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and stepped up joint military training. The Philippines is now hosting an “indefinite” deployment of a US Army Typhon medium-range missile system despite China’s vocal objections. This is a substantial symbol of mutual commitment.
But now Biden and his exceptional Asia policy team are departing the scene. And despite Trump’s naming of a number of China hawks to national security positions, the outlines of his Asia policy remain unclear as does his view of the importance of the Philippine alliance. Yet contrary to what might have been expected, neither Manila nor Beijing is seeking a pause in the confrontation as Biden prepares to exit stage left with a difficult-to-predict Trump waiting in the wings.
On Nov. 8, Marcos signed into law two new bills pertaining to the Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea. China responded with a legal escalation, drawing straight baselines around Scarborough Shoal and thus further clarifying its own egregious territorial claim. A few days later, Philippine defense secretary Gilberto Teodoro told the Financial Times that the Philippines wishes to purchase from the United States the Typhon missile system, which would be useful for defending its maritime territory.
“What we see is an increasing demand by Beijing for us to concede our sovereign rights in the area,” Teodoro told the press after meeting this Australian counterpart, accusing China of “aggression” against the Philippines.
A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman placed the blame for tensions on the Philippines, while also admitting that China is upping the pressure: “If the Philippines no longer infringes and provokes, there will be no more escalation of the maritime situation.” Taiwan’s foreign ministry, for its part, has told both Manila and Beijing to behave themselves, asserting that their legal maneuvering does “not change the fact that the South China Sea islands are part of ROC (Taiwan) territory.”
What explains this continued jostling amid political uncertainty in the United States? On the one hand, it could be that very uncertainty that is driving Manila and Beijing. With Donald Trump returning to office, the Philippines may be concerned about the alliance’s continued maturation. The past and future president’s well-known skepticism about alliances raises questions about his commitment to the mutual defense treaty. Marcos may be hoping to elicit an uptick in US support to set a new baseline before Trump takes the oath of office.
Xi, for his part, may be worried that Trump will be more aggressive vis-a-vis China than he was during much of his first term, given COVID-19’s role in ending his first presidency and the Republican Party’s hawkish consensus on China policy. Like Marcos, Xi may be looking to lock in gains before Jan. 21.
But perhaps more likely, the latest back-and-forth in the South China Sea may have little to do with the recent American election. The Sino-Philippine dispute has a logic all its own, driven by domestic politics in both countries and regional Southeast Asian dynamics. Neither is conducive to de-escalation.
Whatever the reason for the latest developments, tensions seem likely to continue to build in the months to come. The first international crisis of Trump’s second term may not be in Europe or the Middle East or in the Taiwan Strait, but rather in the South China Sea. Taipei should plan accordingly.
Michael Mazza is a senior director at the Project 2049 Institute and a senior non-resident fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.
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