US president-elect Donald Trump’s re-election poses potential challenges for Taiwan’s relationships in Southeast Asia, as US policies and the broader global dynamics shift. While his first term was marked by direct confrontations with China, a second term could bring new complexities that place Taiwan in a difficult position, particularly as Southeast Asian nations often find themselves caught between Washington and Beijing.
Taiwan’s key challenge lies in the intensifying US-China rivalry, which pressures Southeast Asian countries to align with one of the two powers. Nations with deep trade ties to both countries, such as Vietnam, are already strained by Beijing’s stance on South China Sea disputes. A more aggressive US approach under Trump could force these countries to commit to either US or China, especially in trade and security. For Taiwan, this dynamic is problematic, as China might push Southeast Asian nations to curb ties with Taiwan in exchange for economic or political incentives. Countries could limit engagement with Taiwan to maintain stability with China, ultimately reducing Taiwan’s regional influence.
Trump’s hawkish stance on China, particularly regarding the South China Sea, could heighten military tensions in Southeast Asia, a region already sensitive to US-China rivalry. The Philippines, for example, won an arbitration case against China in 2016, and Trump’s subsequent support for its maritime claims escalated the regional stakes. Taiwan’s own claims in the South China Sea overlap with those of the Philippines, Vietnam and China, which can intensify local disputes.
If Trump’s second term brings a more aggressive military posture, Southeast Asian countries, many of which prefer neutrality, might feel pressured to avoid close ties with Taiwan to prevent antagonizing China. The nation’s security is deeply tied to the Taiwan Strait’s stability, complicating its regional standing. Furthermore, its participation in US-led security initiatives might provoke Beijing, discouraging Southeast Asian nations from cooperating with Taipei on security matters. This dynamic could limit Taiwan’s ability to strengthen its regional security alliances, even though it shares Southeast Asia’s concerns regarding China’s territorial ambitions.
Trump’s “America First” policies, focused on protectionism and bilateral trade, could also disrupt global trade and supply chains, complicating Taiwan’s economic engagement in Southeast Asia. During Trump’s first term, the US-China trade war prompted Taiwanese companies such as Foxconn to relocate production to countries such as Vietnam and Thailand, boosting these economies, but also increasing Chinese scrutiny. For example, despite Vietnam’s gains from trade shifts, it was criticized by the US for its trade surplus.
If Trump continues prioritizing protectionism, Southeast Asian nations might face a delicate balancing act between aligning with the US and avoiding deeper ties with Taiwan to maintain good relations with China. Vietnam, which values neutrality, might be less inclined to strengthen economic ties with the nation if US-China tensions escalate. Should Trump accelerate the decoupling with Beijing, many Southeast Asian countries, heavily dependent on Chinese trade, might prioritize those relationships over partnerships with Taipei. This shift could restrict Taiwan’s economic influence in the region, despite being one of the largest foreign investors.
Southeast Asian nations have carefully balanced their autonomy amid rising US-China tensions, yet Trump’s assertive policies could pressure them to choose sides, complicating their neutral stance. This dynamic places Taiwan in a delicate position, as it might be seen as a flashpoint in the region’s balancing act between the superpowers. Countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia, which prioritize maintaining their own strategic interests, might limit engagement with Taiwan to avoid straining ties with China and disrupting the equilibrium they aim to preserve. The fear of provoking China leads these countries to avoid taking strong positions on Taiwan, limiting the scope for deeper engagement.
Further complicating matters, Trump’s preference for bilateral over multilateral agreements could restrict Taiwan’s access to regional and global frameworks. Southeast Asian nations might be wary of involving Taiwan in multilateral groups such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), as doing so risks provoking China. Trump’s previous withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) exemplifies his transactional approach to diplomacy, which might not align with Taiwan’s aspirations for regional integration and multilateral partnerships. Taiwan’s efforts to join major economic groups such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) also face challenges, as Southeast Asian countries might feel compelled to prioritize their relations with China. Trump’s bilateral focus had left a void that China has attempted to fill through initiatives such as the RCEP, further complicating Taiwan’s goals. Should Trump continue this approach in his second term, Southeast Asian countries might be reluctant to support Taiwan’s bid for CPTPP membership, fearing potential fallout from China.
Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy could further complicate Taiwan’s regional strategy as well. In June, he expressed discontent with the nation’s role in the semiconductor industry, claiming that the US helped establish it, while accusing Taipei of not contributing enough to Washington’s defense costs. He suggested that Taiwan should bear more responsibility for its defense, even calling for the US to treat the nation as an “insurance policy,” rather than a dependent. Trump also proposed tariffs on Taiwanese chips, saying that it had “stolen” US business. These comments raised concerns about the direction of US policy toward Taiwan during his second term. With shifting US priorities and frequent policy reversals, Southeast Asian countries might find it difficult to rely on Washington’s sustained support for Taipei. That uncertainty could lead them to strengthen ties with China instead of Taiwan, sidelining Taiwan’s interests. A second Trump term could deprioritize Taiwan’s non-political engagement strategies, such as in health, education and sustainable development — areas where the nation has gained goodwill without directly challenging China. For example, Taiwan’s medical support during the COVID-19 pandemic was well received in countries such as Thailand and the Philippines. However, with Trump likely focusing on military and economic competition, such cooperative initiatives might be sidelined, limiting Taiwan’s ability to strengthen long-term, non-confrontational partnerships in Southeast Asia.
Trump’s second term policy could create potential challenges for Taiwan’s engagement in the region. An intensified US-China rivalry combined with protectionist trade policies and an increased focus on military matters might push Southeast Asian nations to adopt a more cautious stance toward Taiwan. As these countries carefully balance their relationships with both superpowers, the nation might need to adopt a low-profile, non-provocative strategy to avoid inflaming tensions with China while still leveraging its economic and technological strengths. Taiwan’s ability to build deeper economic, non-diplomatic ties with Southeast Asia under Trump’s policies could be constrained, requiring flexibility in navigating this complex and evolving landscape.
Tran Thi Mong Tuyen is a doctoral student at National Cheng Chi University and a former fellow at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan and visiting scholar at National Taiwan University.
Minister of Labor Hung Sun-han (洪申翰) on April 9 said that the first group of Indian workers could arrive as early as this year as part of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center in India and the India Taipei Association. Signed in February 2024, the MOU stipulates that Taipei would decide the number of migrant workers and which industries would employ them, while New Delhi would manage recruitment and training. Employment would be governed by the laws of both countries. Months after its signing, the two sides agreed that 1,000 migrant workers from India would
In recent weeks, Taiwan has witnessed a surge of public anxiety over the possible introduction of Indian migrant workers. What began as a policy signal from the Ministry of Labor quickly escalated into a broader controversy. Petitions gathered thousands of signatures within days, political figures issued strong warnings, and social media became saturated with concerns about public safety and social stability. At first glance, this appears to be a straightforward policy question: Should Taiwan introduce Indian migrant workers or not? However, this framing is misleading. The current debate is not fundamentally about India. It is about Taiwan’s labor system, its
On March 31, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs released declassified diplomatic records from 1995 that drew wide domestic media attention. One revelation stood out: North Korea had once raised the possibility of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In a meeting with visiting Chinese officials in May 1995, as then-Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) prepared for a visit to South Korea, North Korean officials objected to Beijing’s growing ties with Seoul and raised Taiwan directly. According to the newly released records, North Korean officials asked why Pyongyang should refrain from developing relations with Taiwan while China and South Korea were expanding high-level
Japan’s imminent easing of arms export rules has sparked strong interest from Warsaw to Manila, Reuters reporting found, as US President Donald Trump wavers on security commitments to allies, and the wars in Iran and Ukraine strain US weapons supplies. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s ruling party approved the changes this week as she tries to invigorate the pacifist country’s military industrial base. Her government would formally adopt the new rules as soon as this month, three Japanese government officials told Reuters. Despite largely isolating itself from global arms markets since World War II, Japan spends enough on its own
RSS