Navy Commander Admiral Tang Hua (唐華) said in an interview with The Economist that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been implementing an “anaconda strategy” to subdue Taiwan since President William Lai (賴清德) assumed office. The Chinese military is “slowly, but surely” increasing its presence around Taiwan proper, it quoted Tang as saying.
“They are ready to blockade Taiwan at any time they want,” he said. “They give you extreme pressure, pressure, pressure. They’re trying to exhaust you.”
Beijing’s goal is to “force Taiwan to make mistakes,” Tang said, adding that they could be “excuses” for a blockade.
The interview reminds me of a story published in late August about the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a US think tank, mentioning that China is using an “anaconda strategy” to slowly strangle Taiwan — as an anaconda might overcome its prey — leaving no room for Taiwan to breathe or fight back.
Almost at the same time, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank, published a report titled How China could blockade Taiwan, raising the possibility of China isolating Taiwan in the scenario of an “all-out kinetic blockade.”
First, China would say, citing its “Anti-Secession” Law, that Taiwan has engaged in unacceptable moves toward independence and announce that the PLA and maritime law enforcement forces would conduct seven days of joint live-fire exercises around Taiwan.
The announcement would indicate that exercises would begin in 48 hours and take place in five air and maritime exclusion zones. The operations would involve unprecedented levels of PLA activity, including aircraft and surface vessels encroaching into Taiwan’s territorial waters and airspace.
After that, Chinese submarines would covertly deploy mines at the entrances to six of Taiwan’s key ports and energy terminal facilities.
On day three of the exercises, China and Russia would hold joint strategic aerial patrols to deter Japan from intervening and to create concerns about Russian support for China.
On the fifth day, China would announce that in 48 hours the PLA would initiate “special law enforcement operations to punish Taiwanese independence elements,” replacing the original five exclusion zones with a single maritime and air exclusion zone covering the entirety of Taiwan proper and the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing would say that unauthorized vessels or aircraft entering the zone would be warned and then fired upon if they do not comply.
About 48 hours later, China would commence its “special law enforcement operations.” The PLA would launch joint strikes against Taiwan’s military and communications facilities, energy import terminals, fuel storage facilities and power grid to undermine the its ability to sustain itself.
The PLA would simultaneously cut undersea Internet cables and incapacitate Taiwan’s communications satellites to disrupt links within Taiwan and sever its connections with the international community.
Once Taiwan’s defensive capabilities are significantly degraded, China would position seven naval surface action groups around Taiwan. Each group would comprise three to six vessels, including warships and submarines.
The PLA Navy would also position its Shandong aircraft carrier strike group southeast of Taiwan to deter US Navy vessels.
A week after offensive operations begin, Beijing would pause kinetic strikes to offer an opportunity for negotiations and time for noncombatant evacuation operations. China would offer to establish humanitarian corridors for Taiwanese to seek refuge in China.
These plans are designed to weaken Taiwan’s internal cohesion and willingness to fight.
Although a direct invasion is unlikely, Beijing would still exhaust Taiwan’s strategic resources and internal cohesion with economic, political and military means.
Taiwan should demonstrate its determination to defend itself to China, the international community and especially the US. Concrete action to improve defense resilience of the whole society would be to increase the defense budget, bolster reservist capabilities and diversify energy sources to deter China’s expansion of its authoritarianism.
Liao Ming-hui is an assistant researcher at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research.
Translated by Fion Khan
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