There appears to be a growing view among leaders and leading thinkers in Taiwan that their words and actions have no influence over how China approaches cross-Strait relations. According to this logic, China’s actions toward Taiwan are guided by China’s unwavering ambition to assert control over Taiwan. Many also believe Beijing’s approach is influenced by China’s domestic politics.
As the thinking goes, former President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) made a good faith effort to demonstrate her moderation on cross-Strait issues throughout her tenure. During her 2016 inaugural address, Tsai sent several constructive signals, including by acknowledging the historical fact of interactions and joint understandings between Taiwan and Chinese representatives in 1992, and also by pledging to conduct cross-Strait relations in accordance with the Republic of China constitution. This implied an acknowledgement of the existence of one China with different interpretations over its boundaries. Beijing responded to the speech by demeaning Tsai like a teacher would scold a student, asserting that her speech was like “an incomplete test answer.”
Over the subsequent eight years, Tsai pursued a calm, steady, and predictable approach to cross-Strait relations. She vowed to neither yield to nor provoke Chinese pressure. Beijing nevertheless maintained a closed public posture toward Tsai and ceaselessly ratcheted up pressure on Taiwan. China’s unrelenting coercion of Taiwan was far from peaceful.
During Taiwan’s 2024 elections, Beijing supported opposition parties and their candidates and sought to undermine then-Vice President Lai Ching-te’s (賴清德) candidacy for president. After securing victory, Lai nevertheless vowed to maintain continuity in approach to cross-Strait relations, including by keeping key members from the Tsai administration on his staff.
During his inaugural address, Lai expressed openness to direct dialogue with Beijing and made comments that his supporters believed represented broad continuity with public statements that previous Taiwan leaders had made. Beijing saw things differently, referring to Lai as a “dangerous separatist” and then launching a major military exercise. Beijing asserted that the military drills surrounding Taiwan, “Joint Sword-2024-A,” were a “strong punishment” for what China said were the twin sins of “separatist actions” and “external interference” by the United States and others in China’s affairs.
Lai took a relatively more measured tone to his October 10 national day address. While maintaining the position that Taiwan and China are not subordinate to each other, Lai also reiterated Taiwan’s commitment to peace and stability and its openness to dialogue with China on the basis of “parity and dignity.” Lai also proposed that Taiwan and China cooperate on shared challenges such as climate change.
Beijing nevertheless responded strongly, both by publicly condemning Lai and by launching another military drill surrounding Taiwan, “Joint Sword-2024-B.” Instead of reciprocating Lai’s relative restraint, China’s leaders ramped up their encroachment and bullying of Taiwan. China’s military exercise introduced new elements, like Chinese Coast Guard involvement in the drills. It also established a new record for Chinese military aircraft operating around Taiwan in a single day. Chinese commentators intimated that Beijing would go further in pressuring Taiwan in the future.
This pattern of Chinese responses to Taiwan leaders’ statements and actions begs the question: Does restraint on the part of Taiwan’s leaders do any good in the face of China’s ever-tightening squeeze of Taiwan?
Cynicism that anything can be done to influence China’s approach is the easy response. And it is the wrong instinct for Taiwan’s long-term interests.
To be clear, I do not hold out any hope that China will lessen its military or grey-zone pressure on China any time soon. China has fielded massive amounts of military and paramilitary capabilities that it seems determined to use around Taiwan. Beijing wants to demonstrate return on investment for their massive military investment by seeking to induce anxiety and fear inside Taiwan, while working to deter the United States and others from involving themselves in cross-Strait issues. So long as Beijing believes it can squeeze Taiwan at little cost or risk to itself, it likely will continue to do so. In the face of this rising pressure, Taiwan and its partners will need to expand their menu of responses. They will need to employ skillful new tactics, including by demonstrating that greater Chinese pressure on Taiwan only serves to generate greater international support for Taiwan’s security, prosperity, and dignity and respect on the world stage. This will require more than just Taiwan pushing back on China’s rising pressure.
This leads to a larger point. To exceed Beijing’s expectations for responding to rising PRC pressure, Taiwan will need to attract greater support from more actors for upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
The more Taiwan’s leaders can credibly present themselves as steady, calm, moderate, and genuinely open to direct dialogue with Beijing, the better of a case they can make to other partners for greater support. Conversely, the more Taiwan’s leaders eschew restraint and opt instead for poking China’s leaders to score points, the more wary other countries will be about involving themselves in Taiwan’s affairs.
Building direct channels of communication between Beijing and Taipei need not involve press releases and public fanfare. There are past instances when both sides have been able to clarify intentions and preview plans privately in ways that gradually instilled mutual confidence.
Ultimately, Taiwan’s leaders cannot control how Beijing approaches cross-Strait relations. They can, however, influence global perceptions of developments in the Taiwan Strait. The more Taiwan’s leaders can credibly present themselves as reliable, steady, and committed to direct communication with Beijing, the stronger a position Taiwan will be in to attract international involvement in efforts to uphold peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Ryan Hass is a senior fellow, the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and the Director of the China Center at the Brookings Institution.
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