Taiwan’s journey to joining the UN would be long and arduous. Under UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, passed on Oct. 25 1971, the UN recognized the People’s Republic of China as “the only legitimate representatives of China in the United Nations” and removed “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” (蔣介石). Although the resolution handed Beijing China’s seat in the UN, it did not state that Taiwan is part of China. Therefore, applying for UN membership under the name “Taiwan” remains feasible.
US President Joe Biden has continued former US president Donald Trump’s hardline policy on China and determination to safeguard freedom, openness and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and the Taiwan Strait. Although the US has changed its strategy toward China, Washington has not yet revised its diplomatic guidelines that state it would “continue to support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations where statehood is not a requirement and encourage Taiwan’s meaningful participation in organizations where its membership is not possible.”
Before applying for UN membership, Taiwan must urge the US to amend its policies to obtain its full support, and then seek to participate in the WHO, where Taiwan has the best chance to become a member. That would be the stepping stone for Taiwan to knock on the UN’s door.
Considering trilateral relations between Taiwan, the US and China, under the US’ bipartisan consensus of supporting Taiwan and resisting China, no matter whether US Vice President Kamala Harris or Trump is elected president in November, the US Congress would continue to pass Taiwan-friendly acts to further deepen Taiwan-US ties.
The US is expected to continue invoking the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 to bolster Taiwan’s resistance to China, supporting the nation’s participation in global bodies such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization and UNESCO.
However, Taiwan could only hope to participate in the World Health Assembly as an observer, with the support of the US, rather than as a WHO member.
Taiwanese representatives in the US should work with powerful overseas Taiwanese groups such as the Formosan Association for Public Affairs to improve ties with Taiwan-friendly members of the US Congress and support their election campaigns.
Building closer relationships with the US lawmakers, Taiwanese can lobby them to amend diplomatic guidelines to “support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations where statehood is a requirement.”
During the US presidential election campaign, the government should urge overseas Taiwanese to support pro-Taiwan candidates — as Israelis do — and try to make Taiwanese issues a focus of the election, to establish a Taiwan Strait policy and closer relations with the White House.
If this can be done, Taiwan might have a chance to join the WHO. Then, the nation would be able to use its expertise in public health to make significant contributions to the international community, paving the way to becoming a UN member.
Amid intense competition between the US and China, the Taiwanese government should not only seek to strengthen the discourse on the importance of Taiwan’s strategic status, but also use the US’ Taiwan Assurance and the Taiwan Travel acts to continue reinforcing interactions between high-level Taiwanese and US officials. The government should also use the Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue to build the Taiwan-US semiconductor supply chain. By deepening economic and trade relations, and establishing a closer, symbiotic relationship between the countries, Taiwan can increase its chances of joining the UN.
Michael Lin is a retired diplomat, formerly posted in the US.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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