Earlier this month in Newsweek, President William Lai (賴清德) challenged the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to retake the territories lost to Russia in the 19th century rather than invade Taiwan.
He stated: “If it is for the sake of territorial integrity, why doesn’t [the PRC] take back the lands occupied by Russia that were signed over in the treaty of Aigun?”
This was a brilliant political move to finally state openly what many Chinese in both China and Taiwan have long been thinking about the lost territories in the Russian far east: The Russian far east should be “theirs.”
Granted, Lai issued this challenge in part to save Taiwan from further Chinese threats of forced unification, but his criticism is accurate. Lai’s challenge, therefore, marks a new stage for Taiwanese diplomacy, one in which it acts more assertively, decisively and is more aware of the power of good media and the influence of insightful “sound bites.”
Regarding China’s “lost territories,” the PRC maps of the Russian far east issued in February last year called Vladivostok and Khabarovsk by their Chinese names, which are “Haishenwai” (海參崴) and “Boli” (玻璃). The PRC clearly still feels aggrieved at the manner in which Russia and its governor-general of Siberia, Nikolay Muraviev, seized the Ussuri and Amur rivers and all of northern Manchuria, and coerced Qing Dynasty China into signing the Treaty of Aigun in 1858 and the Treaty of Beijing in 1860.
With Lai’s declaration, China and Taiwan can now move forward together to recover the lost territories. Both have always felt a long-standing grievance toward Russia, which played a major role during the “century of humiliation,” as Russia not only took more land from China than any other foreign power, but it still retains most, if not all, of it. At least now there is no more saying one thing to Russia while painting an entirely different picture for domestic audiences.
In the end, it is Beijing’s leaders who control China’s land borders and so have the responsibility to reclaim or give up these territories. This puts pressure on Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), who must now negotiate with Russia to satisfy his domestic audience. It is a task he should deal with as assertively as Lai.
History is for once on the side of the Chinese. “How,” you might ask? A little-known set of documents from 1919 and 1920 called the Karakhan manifestos pave the way, allowing China to negotiate for the return of the “lost territories.”
The 1919 and 1920 Karakhan manifestos were issued and signed by Lev Karakhan, the Soviet deputy minister of foreign affairs, in order to win over China as an ally during the Russian Civil War. These manifestos promised to return to China all territories taken in Siberia and Manchuria during the Tsarist period, return the Chinese Eastern Railway and other concessions.
As they were signed by Karakhan, they stand as legal unilateral declarations from Russia to China. Furthermore, these manifestos were confirmed by a “1924 secret protocol” signed by representatives of both governments.
Since Lai’s challenge was published on Sept. 2, China has yet to issue its own diplomatic position. China is finally in the driver’s seat in its relationship with Russia.
From 1925 to 1991, the USSR refused to negotiate with China on the return of the “lost territories.” China should cut off all monetary aid, financial institutional lending and credits (such as those issued by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), covert military aid and dual-use technologies (such as drones, technologies, replacement parts and the like) until Russia signs an international treaty to return the negotiated territories.
This event should be witnessed by diplomats from other nations, the UN and representatives from the International Court of Justice (The Hague).
Russia is in the middle of a long protracted war with Ukraine. If China were to cut off all aid, materiel and loans, Russia would not only lose the war, but also face the danger of being divided and ruled by various regional Russian leaders. China is now clearly in the driver’s seat. The fact is, it has an economy more than six times larger than that of Russia’s: US$33.71 trillion to US$5.78 trillion respectively.
The USSR caused China extreme pain and the loss of national territory. It was the USSR that detached Mongolia, Tannu Tuva, the Russian far east both west and east of the Amur River, and other Chinese territories in Central Asia.
China must now decide whether to demand these lands back. To do nothing while it holds a superior negotiating position due to the Ukraine war is to revert to the past. In the present day, PRC diplomats have continually boasted of a “wolf warrior psyche.” It is time to put those boasts to the test.
Lai has made a good first step. It is now time for Xi to negotiate from a position of strength, or else the results will be the same for China as in the past. Will the Chinese people meekly endure a third century of humiliation?
Jon K. Chang is a research associate at Northwestern Oklahoma State University. He has a doctorate in Russian history. Bruce A. Elleman is a former professor of maritime history at the US Naval War College in Rhode Island. He has recently retired.
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