Earlier this month in Newsweek, President William Lai (賴清德) challenged the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to retake the territories lost to Russia in the 19th century rather than invade Taiwan.
He stated: “If it is for the sake of territorial integrity, why doesn’t [the PRC] take back the lands occupied by Russia that were signed over in the treaty of Aigun?”
This was a brilliant political move to finally state openly what many Chinese in both China and Taiwan have long been thinking about the lost territories in the Russian far east: The Russian far east should be “theirs.”
Granted, Lai issued this challenge in part to save Taiwan from further Chinese threats of forced unification, but his criticism is accurate. Lai’s challenge, therefore, marks a new stage for Taiwanese diplomacy, one in which it acts more assertively, decisively and is more aware of the power of good media and the influence of insightful “sound bites.”
Regarding China’s “lost territories,” the PRC maps of the Russian far east issued in February last year called Vladivostok and Khabarovsk by their Chinese names, which are “Haishenwai” (海參崴) and “Boli” (玻璃). The PRC clearly still feels aggrieved at the manner in which Russia and its governor-general of Siberia, Nikolay Muraviev, seized the Ussuri and Amur rivers and all of northern Manchuria, and coerced Qing Dynasty China into signing the Treaty of Aigun in 1858 and the Treaty of Beijing in 1860.
With Lai’s declaration, China and Taiwan can now move forward together to recover the lost territories. Both have always felt a long-standing grievance toward Russia, which played a major role during the “century of humiliation,” as Russia not only took more land from China than any other foreign power, but it still retains most, if not all, of it. At least now there is no more saying one thing to Russia while painting an entirely different picture for domestic audiences.
In the end, it is Beijing’s leaders who control China’s land borders and so have the responsibility to reclaim or give up these territories. This puts pressure on Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), who must now negotiate with Russia to satisfy his domestic audience. It is a task he should deal with as assertively as Lai.
History is for once on the side of the Chinese. “How,” you might ask? A little-known set of documents from 1919 and 1920 called the Karakhan manifestos pave the way, allowing China to negotiate for the return of the “lost territories.”
The 1919 and 1920 Karakhan manifestos were issued and signed by Lev Karakhan, the Soviet deputy minister of foreign affairs, in order to win over China as an ally during the Russian Civil War. These manifestos promised to return to China all territories taken in Siberia and Manchuria during the Tsarist period, return the Chinese Eastern Railway and other concessions.
As they were signed by Karakhan, they stand as legal unilateral declarations from Russia to China. Furthermore, these manifestos were confirmed by a “1924 secret protocol” signed by representatives of both governments.
Since Lai’s challenge was published on Sept. 2, China has yet to issue its own diplomatic position. China is finally in the driver’s seat in its relationship with Russia.
From 1925 to 1991, the USSR refused to negotiate with China on the return of the “lost territories.” China should cut off all monetary aid, financial institutional lending and credits (such as those issued by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), covert military aid and dual-use technologies (such as drones, technologies, replacement parts and the like) until Russia signs an international treaty to return the negotiated territories.
This event should be witnessed by diplomats from other nations, the UN and representatives from the International Court of Justice (The Hague).
Russia is in the middle of a long protracted war with Ukraine. If China were to cut off all aid, materiel and loans, Russia would not only lose the war, but also face the danger of being divided and ruled by various regional Russian leaders. China is now clearly in the driver’s seat. The fact is, it has an economy more than six times larger than that of Russia’s: US$33.71 trillion to US$5.78 trillion respectively.
The USSR caused China extreme pain and the loss of national territory. It was the USSR that detached Mongolia, Tannu Tuva, the Russian far east both west and east of the Amur River, and other Chinese territories in Central Asia.
China must now decide whether to demand these lands back. To do nothing while it holds a superior negotiating position due to the Ukraine war is to revert to the past. In the present day, PRC diplomats have continually boasted of a “wolf warrior psyche.” It is time to put those boasts to the test.
Lai has made a good first step. It is now time for Xi to negotiate from a position of strength, or else the results will be the same for China as in the past. Will the Chinese people meekly endure a third century of humiliation?
Jon K. Chang is a research associate at Northwestern Oklahoma State University. He has a doctorate in Russian history. Bruce A. Elleman is a former professor of maritime history at the US Naval War College in Rhode Island. He has recently retired.
On May 7, 1971, Henry Kissinger planned his first, ultra-secret mission to China and pondered whether it would be better to meet his Chinese interlocutors “in Pakistan where the Pakistanis would tape the meeting — or in China where the Chinese would do the taping.” After a flicker of thought, he decided to have the Chinese do all the tape recording, translating and transcribing. Fortuitously, historians have several thousand pages of verbatim texts of Dr. Kissinger’s negotiations with his Chinese counterparts. Paradoxically, behind the scenes, Chinese stenographers prepared verbatim English language typescripts faster than they could translate and type them
More than 30 years ago when I immigrated to the US, applied for citizenship and took the 100-question civics test, the one part of the naturalization process that left the deepest impression on me was one question on the N-400 form, which asked: “Have you ever been a member of, involved in or in any way associated with any communist or totalitarian party anywhere in the world?” Answering “yes” could lead to the rejection of your application. Some people might try their luck and lie, but if exposed, the consequences could be much worse — a person could be fined,
Xiaomi Corp founder Lei Jun (雷軍) on May 22 made a high-profile announcement, giving online viewers a sneak peek at the company’s first 3-nanometer mobile processor — the Xring O1 chip — and saying it is a breakthrough in China’s chip design history. Although Xiaomi might be capable of designing chips, it lacks the ability to manufacture them. No matter how beautifully planned the blueprints are, if they cannot be mass-produced, they are nothing more than drawings on paper. The truth is that China’s chipmaking efforts are still heavily reliant on the free world — particularly on Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Last week, Nvidia chief executive officer Jensen Huang (黃仁勳) unveiled the location of Nvidia’s new Taipei headquarters and announced plans to build the world’s first large-scale artificial intelligence (AI) supercomputer in Taiwan. In Taipei, Huang’s announcement was welcomed as a milestone for Taiwan’s tech industry. However, beneath the excitement lies a significant question: Can Taiwan’s electricity infrastructure, especially its renewable energy supply, keep up with growing demand from AI chipmaking? Despite its leadership in digital hardware, Taiwan lags behind in renewable energy adoption. Moreover, the electricity grid is already experiencing supply shortages. As Taiwan’s role in AI manufacturing expands, it is critical that
RSS