During a televised interview with ERA TV earlier this month, President William Lai (賴清德) said that China wants to annex Taiwan not for the sake of territorial integrity, but for hegemony. Otherwise, China should take back the territory it ceded to Russia in the Treaty of Aigun, especially now that Russia is in its “weakest state.”
Despite Lai’s statement being reported on and republished by international media, China did not dare to respond directly. It was instead a spokesperson from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who provided a response, saying that the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship and the Supplementary Agreement on the Eastern Section of the China-Russia Boundary Line between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation were the final solutions to the border disputes between the two countries.
Russia has conducted large-scale seizures of Chinese territory on multiple occasions. In 1858, the Treaty of Aigun led to Russia’s annexation of more than 600,000km2 of Chinese territory north of the Heilongjiang River and south of the Greater Khingan Range, also known as the Da Hing-gan Range (大興安嶺).
In 1860, the Convention of Peking (中俄北京條約) ceded 400,000km2 of Chinese territory east of the Ussuri River in northeastern China to Russia. In 1864, the Treaty of Tarbagatai, also known as the Treaty of Chuguchak, handed 440,000km2 of Chinese territory in the northwest — including areas east and south of Lake Balkhash — over to Russia. In 1881, the Treaty of Saint Petersburg, also known as the Treaty of Ili, and several subsequent border demarcation agreements resulted in China ceding about 70,000km2 of land, including areas west of the Korgas River in the northwest and east of the Zhaishan Naoer region in northern Xinjiang Province.
It is especially worth noting that following the October Revolution of 1917, the Soviet Union’s deputy people’s commissar for foreign affairs Lev Karakhan issued his first manifesto in 1919, stating that all lands acquired through aggression during the reign of the Russian Empire in China, Manchuria, and elsewhere were to be relinquished.
The following year, the second version of the manifesto reiterated that all agreements concluded by the former Russian Empire with China that involved territorial claims, concessions, or privileges would be declared null and void.
The Soviet government also promised to return all lands and properties seized by the former Russian Empire. Additionally, all Russian assets appropriated from China would be permanently returned to China without remuneration.
At the time the manifesto was published, China was in a state of widespread disorder and thus had no time to deal with the Soviet Union. Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙), a founder of the Republic of China, not only failed to take back the lost territory, he even allowed the Soviet Union’s Red Army to enter and garrison Mongolia in exchange for assistance in establishing the Whampoa Military Academy.
During the Sino-Soviet Conflict of 1929, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did nothing to assist the ROC in repealing the Soviet Union’s privileges. It went so far as to come up with its own slogan about defending the Soviet Union and staged an armed rebellion.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949. The following year, CCP leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. After that, Mao no longer dared to bring up territorial disputes.
Initially, former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) did not recognize the unequal treaties when he came to power. However, after signing the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 and regaining control of Hong Kong, he engaged in negotiations with the Soviet Union.
In 1991, CCP head Jiang Zemin (江澤民), who later became president in 1993, visited the Soviet Union and the two countries signed the Sino-Soviet Border Agreement (中蘇國界東段協定), which established a joint committee to settle border demarcation. In 2005, then Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing (李肇星) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov signed the Certificate for the Exchange of the Instrument of Ratification for the Supplementary Agreement on the Eastern Section of the China-Russia Boundary Line between the PRC and the Russian Federation in Vladivostok, which delimited more than 4,000km of boundary lines between the two countries.
On Tuesday last week, Chinese Vice President Han Zheng (韓正) attended Russia’s Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. During his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Han said he was very pleased to be invited to the city, noting that “Vladivostok” means “Ruler of the East” in Russian. Han’s use of the Russian name rather than the Chinese was likely an attempt at pandering. It further made clear that China remains under the heel of its “big brother” Russia. This behavior following Lai’s comments highlights the CCP’s brazen attitude and lack of boundaries, leading some in China to refer to the CCP as “yellow Russians” (黃俄).
At the next news conference of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Taiwanese reporters should raise this territorial issue and demand a direct response.
Paul Lin is a Taipei-based political commentator.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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