Politically motivated bulldozing has returned with a vengeance in India. Last month in the state of Madhya Pradesh, a local Muslim leader and member of the opposition Congress party watched his home, supposedly “illegally built,” reduced to rubble. A district official then gloated on social media that justice had been served for recent attacks on the police.
Meanwhile, in the neighboring state of Uttar Pradesh, bulldozers flattened an “illegal” shopping complex, owned by a Muslim functionary of an opposition party who had recently been arrested on charges of gang-raping a young girl.
This “bulldozer justice” is nothing new. In Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s India, the homes of those merely suspected of crimes — overwhelmingly Muslims — are frequently demolished with great fanfare, usually on the pretext that they are unauthorized constructions.
State governments controlled by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have found an ideal tool for brutalizing Muslims and firing up the party’s Hindu-supremacist voter base.
Besides being used for retribution, bulldozers serve as tools to control and demoralize already marginalized communities. Not coincidentally, areas where Muslims cluster tend to be targeted for “urban development.”
As a result, more than 150,000 homes have been razed in the last two years, leaving nearly 750,000 people homeless.
Such blatant injustice in a country that bills itself as the “world’s largest democracy” has been normalized to the point that bulldozers now feature in BJP election rallies.
Since Modi’s re-election in 2019, “bulldozer politics” (which even has its own Wikipedia entry) has become one of the BJP’s favorite methods of signaling its commitment to Hindu supremacy and muscular governance.
However, was India’s general election in April to June not meant to end such brazen transgressions?
Having lost his majority for the first time, a “humbled” Modi, we were told, would have to alter his ways to accommodate new allies. Voters had supposedly pulled India “back from the brink” of authoritarian chauvinism and “reasserted India’s democratic credentials.”
These post-election “hot takes” now lie buried beneath a heap of bulldozed rubble. Modi has neither reined in Hindu extremist forces nor dialed down the BJP’s efforts to curb rights, quash dissent and capture democratic institutions. Lynchings and other forms of vigilante mob violence against minorities have only intensified, and police have pressured Muslim shop-owners to display their names so that Hindu shoppers know to stay away.
Moreover, new laws are being devised to crack down even harder on India’s Muslims. One proposal envisages life sentences for Muslim men who pursue romantic relationships with Hindu women — what Hindu supremacists call “love jihad.”
Attacks on intellectuals who are critical of the government are intensifying, and draconian laws are being enacted in the name of combating left-wing terror.
While pesky foreign journalists are being forced to leave, bureaucrats are now allowed to join the BJP’s parent organization, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a right-wing Hindu-supremacist organization that rejects India’s founding principle of equal citizenship for all. Far from being chastened by the election, BJP leaders’ hate speech has become even more vicious. Soon after the election results were announced, a cabinet minister declared that allowing Muslims to live in the country had been India’s biggest mistake. The same man is now supporting a grassroots campaign to boycott Muslim businesses. Similarly, the BJP chief minister of an eastern state recently blamed the Muslim owner of a private university for causing floods — waging “flood jihad.”
To stop “land jihad,” he is advocating laws to restrict land sales between Hindus and Muslims.
Nothing has changed in India. There are only illusions of a democratic revival. Yes, the opposition’s gains have boosted its confidence, and the government has agreed to review various laws and initiatives after facing pushback.
A controversial broadcasting bill to police online content was put on hold this month, leading the regime’s critics to declare that Modi has been weakened, but these are merely tactical retreats.
After all, Modi still retains the tools that enabled him to win a despotic election (far from free and fair, and heavily skewed in favor of the BJP, even if not overtly rigged).
India’s institutions remain captured, and its media servile. The BJP maintains control of the levers that count, including powerful investigative agencies that can intimidate enemies, keep friends in line, and help shake down campaign donors.
With a monopoly over policymaking, Modi can keep businesses on his side, and although the broadcasting bill has been delayed, the government already has ways to block critical voices on social media — which it still does regularly and with impunity. India’s largest state, ruled by the BJP, has just announced that it would punish critical social-media posts with jail terms and reward influencers who amplify its voice.
Still, the perception of a democratic revival in India bestows renewed legitimacy on Modi’s third term. After years of India garnering global attention for its democratic backsliding, many outside observers now believe that its democracy is alive and well, and that the political utility of Hindu chauvinism has reached its limits.
In fact, Modi abandoned any pretense of inclusivity during this year’s election campaign. He and the rest of the BJP repeatedly resorted to Islamophobic messaging, and they are doubling down on the politics of religious polarization.
Ahead of state elections in Jharkhand in a few months, the BJP is openly trying to incite the majority tribal population in the state with claims that Rohingya Muslims — dog whistle for Indian Muslims — are marrying their women and taking their land. Nationally, Modi’s party is preparing for a major showdown with the Muslim community by changing a law governing Muslim charity endowments.
Far from being halted, its democratic backsliding is only accelerating as a more insecure BJP confronts a more assertive opposition. It would take more than a mild electoral setback to reverse what Modi has unleashed.
The chauvinist majoritarian ideology he represents sees power not as an end in itself, but as a means to reshape the state and demolish the country’s constitutionally mandated pluralism. This year’s election was a mere bump in the path of the Hindutva bulldozer.
Debasish Roy Chowdhury is the co-author (with John Keane) of To Kill A Democracy: India’s Passage to Despotism.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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