Over the past few years, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a visible change in the EU’s approach to Taiwan. I call this phenomenon European hype about Taiwan. The change is noticeable at both the EU and member-state levels, with parliaments and Central Europe leading the way.
The best example is the fact that Taiwan is finally mentioned in various EU documents (a real novelty compared with the past 30 years), in addition to statements by European politicians, an increase in bilateral contacts, a growing awareness of Taiwan’s importance and its contribution not only to European prosperity, but also, or even primarily, to security.
The latter has become particularly important since China’s support for Russian President Vladimir Putin after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, embodied in their (in)famous “no limits” friendship.
However, despite the EU’s Taiwan hype, there is still palpable criticism, or at least disappointment, that this change is symbolic rather than substantive. The EU’s unwillingness to start negotiations on the Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIA) is often cited as an emblematic example of the EU’s alleged lip service. I disagree with this assumption.
As we await the new EU institutions after the June elections, it is worth assessing the achievements of the EU’s Taiwan policy so far, and underlining why they are substantial and not merely symbolic.
First, language matters: We should not complain that the EU’s change in Taiwan policy is merely linguistic. I do not buy this argument. If narrative is unimportant and merely symbolic, then why is it so common to claim that there is an ongoing “battle of narratives” between democratic and authoritarian states, and that China in particular is gaining the upper hand when it comes to imposing its own political slogans and understanding of international norms and values, for example in the UN system? Focusing on this and sounding the alarm about China’s behavior is the best evidence that narrative really does matter.
The EU’s surge in mentioning Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait as such, focusing on the nation’s crucial role in the EU’s prosperity and security, should not be underestimated. Four years ago, most Europeans had no idea about Taiwan’s role in the semiconductor industry, ordinary people had no idea how vital the Taiwan Strait is for international trade. I would even venture to say that many Europeans did not know what Taiwan was.
Today, the situation is very different. Europeans’ knowledge of Taiwan, including China’s coercion of the nation, has changed dramatically.
Second, one of the ways to raise Taiwan’s international status and deter China from provoking a crisis is to connect the nation closely to the democratic world. The best way is to increase two-way contacts. Europe’s real contribution to Taiwan’s security is not almost exclusively military, such as sending warships through the Taiwan Strait. This is a very simplistic way of thinking.
The EU is trying to “bind” Taiwan to the free world. This is not just a symbolic approach. Talking more about Taiwan and having more contacts between the two sides on the one hand increases European awareness of Taiwan’s importance, but on the other shows China that, despite its efforts to cut Taiwan’s official diplomatic allies, Taiwan is not isolated, but on the contrary is gaining more friends and becoming involved in the democratic world.
Third, for the sake of substance, it is sometimes better not to make a particular cooperation or progress public or to put it high on the agenda. This is particularly risky in the case of member states, where the high hopes raised by politicians now in power might be dashed after a change of government. In other words, sometimes it is better to keep a low profile to be more effective. And this is the case in EU-Taiwan relations at both the EU and member-state levels.
The BIA is a good example of the argument that sometimes a low profile is better than megaphone diplomacy. For the sake of substance, it is better to avoid highly divisive moves like the BIA. Despite the possibility that starting negotiations is slim due to the lack of political will on the part of the European Commission and the European Council and the fact that Taiwan has reduced its pressure on the issue, experts, both from Taiwan and Europe, are still complaining about this.
Some say that the agreement is being held hostage to the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), which the EU concluded with China in 2020. The CAI has been put on freeze following Beijing’s sanctions against the EU, and no one knows whether it would ever be thawed to pave the way for the BIA.
However, the question is whether it is worth focusing on an issue that could actually be detrimental to both Taiwan and the EU, but beneficial to China. Is there any economic rationale for this agreement when investment from both sides has been steadily increasing and there is no pressure from either the Taiwanese or European business community?
Moreover, at least since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU has shown a consistent and united approach to Russia and China. This is also part of a growing awareness that the security situation in Europe and Asia, especially in the Taiwan Strait, is highly intertwined.
If the BIA is to be put on the EU agenda, this means that the member states (the council) should give the European Commission a mandate to start negotiations. It is almost certain that this would open a public debate about Taiwan, its status, etc. Are we sure that all member states are openly Taiwan-friendly? Is it worthwhile for Taiwan and the EU to have this debate, which would facilitate divisions within the EU? I doubt it. Above all, it would be a huge gift to China.
Justyna Szczudlik is deputy head of research and China analyst with the Polish Institute of International Affairs. She is the former head of the Asia-Pacific Program (2016-2021) and a Taiwan Fellowship recipient (2013, National Chengchi University). Her research focuses on China’s foreign policy, especially China-EU and China-Central Europe relations, as well as cross-strait relations.
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