British Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves in a recent speech reiterated her commitment to “fiscal rules.” These rules require that “the current budget must move into balance” and that “the [national] debt must be falling as a share of the economy by [the Labour government’s] fifth year.”
This involves reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio from its current level of 100 percent within five years and eliminating the budget deficit, which stands at ￡121 billion (US$154 billion), or 4.4 percent of GDP.
At the same time, Labour has pledged to avoid significant tax hikes. Instead, the British government has opted for minor adjustments like abolishing the “non-domiciled” tax exemption for people who live in the UK, but declare a permanent residence in another country, imposing a 20 percent value-added tax on private-school fees and closing tax loopholes.
Consequently, the government must boost economic growth to meet its goals for deficit and debt reduction. While Labour aims to increase annual GDP growth to 2.5 percent (from an average of 1.1 percent from 2008 to last year), achieving this requires increased public investment. Notably, the UK spends less than most G7 countries.
To change this, the government plans to invest heavily in the green transition through the newly established Great British Energy and a planned British National Wealth Fund. However, given that its strict fiscal rules would inevitably constrain public investment, Labour’s economic agenda is more of a bet on growth than a strategy for growth.
Labour’s emphasis on fiscal rules represents the latest chapter in Britain’s ongoing tug-of-war between fiscal rules and discretion. During the Victorian era, British economic policy was built on three main pillars: the gold standard, which required the Bank of England to convert its notes to gold on demand at a fixed price; the balanced-budget rule, which ensured government spending was always covered by revenue; and the so-called “borrowing rule,” which established an annual sinking fund to retire debt, primarily incurred during wars. The economists of the time viewed war as the chief engine of debt build-up.
However, these pillars of “sound money” collapsed in the first half of the 20th century following the two world wars, the intervening Great Depression and the extension of the franchise. Enter John Maynard Keynes and the economics of discretion. Keynes’ liquidity-preference theory says when the future is uncertain, people generally prefer to keep their assets liquid rather than commit to projects that would generate returns at some undetermined future date.
Keynes believed that economic booms occurred only during periods of irrational exuberance and that the normal state of the capitalist economy was one of “underemployment equilibrium.” The solution lay not in “abolishing booms and thus keeping us permanently in a semi-slump,” but in “abolishing slumps and thus keeping us permanently in a quasi-boom.” The mechanism for achieving this was autonomous investment by the state, which would bridge the gap between what banks were willing to lend and what borrowers were willing to invest.
Keynesian economic policies were discretionary: Fixed exchange rates became “adjustable pegs,” budgetary policy depended on employment levels, and the government would tell the Bank of England what interest rates to set. Despite the reliance on massive increases in public spending to meet growing welfare entitlements, the Keynesian era proved to be a huge success. From the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s, the UK enjoyed full employment, annual growth rates averaging 2-to-3 percent, rising GDP per capita, and stable inflation. As then-British prime minister Harold Macmillan famously remarked in 1957, Britons “never had it so good.”
The situation began to deteriorate in the late 1960s. While this was arguably the result of external shocks like the Vietnam War and the quadrupling of oil prices rather than hubris on the part of Keynesian policymakers, skyrocketing inflation and growing industrial disorder ultimately set the stage for Milton Friedman’s monetarism and the return of fiscal rules. Monetary policy would be entrusted to independent central banks tasked with securing low and stable inflation. Without strict fiscal rules, a competitive democracy would inevitably lead to excessive public spending, a new generation of political economists said.
Consequently, the budget needed to be “balanced over the business cycle,” and government debt as a share of GDP had to remain low.
These new rules, essentially modified versions of Victorian-era principles, led to two reasonably good decades in the 1990s and 2000s. Then came the great financial crash of 2007 and 2008, from which the British economy and most of its European counterparts have never completely recovered.
It seems that whether you try to steady economies by discretion as Keynes suggests or by rules of Friedman, you ultimately mess up. Promises to “get the economy moving” are invariably followed by economic crises. There is no clear explanation for this, except perhaps that mediocrity is humanity’s lot.
Two reflections are pertinent to Reeves’ dilemma. Britain’s problem is not a lack of money — the financial system is awash with the money created by quantitative easing — but underinvestment. Today’s risk-averse climate can be read as a vindication of Keynes’ liquidity preference story. So public investment is needed to “crowd in” reluctant private investment.
The other crucial point is geopolitics. The US-style Keynesianism that faltered during the Vietnam War was “military Keynesianism” — borrowing and rising debt were justified by the demands of the Cold War and the arms race with the Soviet Union. Fiscal rules were subordinated to the need to “contain” the enemy, and national-security demands always had ample resources to draw from.
Labour’s stated mission is to make Britain greener. I suspect it would end up focusing on making the country safer rather than greener, with borrowing to “get Britain moving” justified not on economic grounds but in the name of national security.
This is a dispiriting prospect. Given the history of the rules-versus-discretion debate, it is hard to believe in British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s promised new dawn.
Robert Skidelsky, a member of the British House of Lords, is professor emeritus of political economy at Warwick University. He is the author of an award-winning biography of John Maynard Keynes and The Machine Age: An Idea, a History, a Warning.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
In the US’ National Security Strategy (NSS) report released last month, US President Donald Trump offered his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The “Trump Corollary,” presented on page 15, is a distinctly aggressive rebranding of the more than 200-year-old foreign policy position. Beyond reasserting the sovereignty of the western hemisphere against foreign intervention, the document centers on energy and strategic assets, and attempts to redraw the map of the geopolitical landscape more broadly. It is clear that Trump no longer sees the western hemisphere as a peaceful backyard, but rather as the frontier of a new Cold War. In particular,
As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) races toward its 2027 modernization goals, most analysts fixate on ship counts, missile ranges and artificial intelligence. Those metrics matter — but they obscure a deeper vulnerability. The true future of the PLA, and by extension Taiwan’s security, might hinge less on hardware than on whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can preserve ideological loyalty inside its own armed forces. Iran’s 1979 revolution demonstrated how even a technologically advanced military can collapse when the social environment surrounding it shifts. That lesson has renewed relevance as fresh unrest shakes Iran today — and it should
When it became clear that the world was entering a new era with a radical change in the US’ global stance in US President Donald Trump’s second term, many in Taiwan were concerned about what this meant for the nation’s defense against China. Instability and disruption are dangerous. Chaos introduces unknowns. There was a sense that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) might have a point with its tendency not to trust the US. The world order is certainly changing, but concerns about the implications for Taiwan of this disruption left many blind to how the same forces might also weaken
On today’s page, Masahiro Matsumura, a professor of international politics and national security at St Andrew’s University in Osaka, questions the viability and advisability of the government’s proposed “T-Dome” missile defense system. Matsumura writes that Taiwan’s military budget would be better allocated elsewhere, and cautions against the temptation to allow politics to trump strategic sense. What he does not do is question whether Taiwan needs to increase its defense capabilities. “Given the accelerating pace of Beijing’s military buildup and political coercion ... [Taiwan] cannot afford inaction,” he writes. A rational, robust debate over the specifics, not the scale or the necessity,
RSS