Shortly after Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) stepped down as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, his successor, Xi Jinping (習近平), articulated the “Chinese Dream,” which aims to rejuvenate the nation and restore its historical glory. While defense analysts and media often focus on China’s potential conflict with Taiwan, achieving “rejuvenation” would require Beijing to engage in at least six different conflicts with at least eight countries. These include territories ranging from the South China Sea and East China Sea to Inner Asia, the Himalayas and lands lost to Russia. Conflicts would involve Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, India, Japan, Mongolia and Russia.
On July 8, 2013, Wen Wei Po, a Hong Kong daily with close links to the CCP, published an article titled “The Six Wars to Be Fought by China in the Next 50 Years.” According to this article, China plans to wage six wars to reclaim territories lost during the Opium War of 1840 to 1842. The timeline for these wars is as follows: the First War, Unification of Taiwan (2020 to 2025); the Second War, Reconquest of the Spratly Islands (2025 to 2030); the Third War, Reconquest of Southern Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh in India) (2035 to 2040); the Fourth War, Reconquest of the Senkaku and Ryukyu Islands from Japan (2040 to 2045); the Fifth War, Unification of Outer Mongolia (2045 to 2050); and the Sixth War, Taking Back Lands Lost to Russia (2055 to 2060).
The First War, the Taiwan conflict of 2025, shows that a peaceful annexation of Taiwan by China is unlikely because it is not in Taiwan’s interests. The article’s author argued that Taiwan’s talk of independence is merely political posturing and that Taiwan actually prefers maintaining the “status quo.” However, China, unwilling to maintain the “status quo,” aims to take Taiwan by force if necessary to achieve its goals. The author assumes US intervention is possible, but still believes China would win. If the US attacks the Chinese mainland, Beijing would retaliate with an unlimited war on the US.
Given the chronological order of the six wars, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) must win the Taiwan conflict to achieve its full set of goals. It is unlikely to enter the conflict unless confident of victory. However, the US policy of strategic ambiguity and strengthening defense ties with Japan, South Korea and regional allies like the Philippines complicates Xi’s planning. The entire series of wars could be a non-starter if Xi believes Washington would intervene. Alternatively, if Xi sees no other means to save face and solidify his place in history, he might launch an attack, potentially triggering a major war and derailing the rest of his plans.
According to the article, after defeating Taiwan, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would take a short break to resupply and prepare for the second war, the conquest of the Spratly Islands. Beijing’s gamble is that its recent victory in Taiwan would coerce claimant nations into a negotiated solution, allowing China to claim the Spratlys while granting some usage rights. Despite this, the Philippines and Vietnam are likely to resist, even though they are severely outgunned. Consequently, China plans to attack Vietnam first.
Before the third war, Xi plans to boost the PLA’s strength. His goal is to modernize the military by 2035 and to become a world-class military by 2049, coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. By then, he aims for the PLA to surpass the US military in power. The delay is likely because India is currently ranked as the world’s fourth-most powerful military.
Rather than a full-scale military engagement with India, China plans to launch a lightning-fast attack on Arunachal Pradesh. Once secured, it would be difficult to dislodge China by diplomatic or military means. However, by this time, the Indian military would also be more powerful, a detail the author had not considered.
In the fourth war, for the Senkaku and Ryukyu Islands, the author assumes that the US would aid Japan, but would be weakened. He also assumes that Europe would stay out of the conflict for diplomatic reasons. With China controlling Taiwan, they could interfere with Japan’s maritime communications and enforce a blockade, leading to widespread famine in Japan. Consequently, the author believes China would prevail again.
The fifth war with Mongolia, in the author’s opinion, would be quick and easy. The people of Mongolia would first be offered a referendum to join China voluntarily or face war. If they chose war, the PLA would invade the tiny country of 3.3 million people, whose standing army consists of only 35,000 personnel. And once again, China would win.
In the sixth and final war, China takes on Russia, the world’s No. 2 military power, to reclaim large swaths of territory that Beijing claims were stolen by the Soviet Union. The author assumes that by 2055 to 2060, Russia’s power would be in decline and China would have a massive advantage, having recently won five other wars.
The six-war theory falls apart beginning with the first war, which ignores the possibility of intervention by the US, Japan, Australia, the UK, South Korea and other Western allies. If China loses the war for Taiwan, the other wars would be postponed, if for no other reason than because the war with Japan depends on China already holding Taiwan. Assuming the six-war strategy is taken seriously by the world, it is plausible that all countries on the list, including India and Russia, would intervene diplomatically, if not militarily, before their scheduled war dates. Additionally, the theory overlooks India’s military modernization and makes questionable assumptions about the US and Russia declining in power.
As a forecast, the article is not very useful. However, it gives an interesting look into what Xi might be thinking and how the PLA’s planning could be flawed. Diplomatically, the article can only help the US-led side. Since it is public, it alerts claimant countries in the Spratly Islands to what might happen, making them more likely to support Taiwan. Japan has always been firm about standing up to China, and this article confirms that Japan’s remilitarization and closer ties with the US, Taiwan and the Philippines are the right moves. Finally, India and Russia now realize that once China no longer needs them, Beijing might attack them.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiaotong University, studies national defense at the American Military University in West Virginia.
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