Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to Russia in five years underscores the strategic importance India attaches to its relationship with Moscow. Indian leaders view that relationship as essential to a balanced foreign policy — especially at a time when India seems, at least to some, to be subtly tilting toward the West — and to providing strategic leverage against China.
Russia and India started holding annual summits in 2000. After Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2021 trip to New Delhi, it was Modi’s turn to visit Moscow in 2022.
However, in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine — which spurred the US and its partners to impose unprecedented sanctions on the country — Modi kept deferring his visit.
Illustration: Mountain People
He did meet Putin in 2022 on the sidelines of a regional summit in Uzbekistan, where he told the Russian leader that it was no time for war.
Today, it is apparent that Russia has neither been isolated internationally nor hobbled economically, despite the West’s best efforts. So, after narrowly winning a third term last month, Modi announced that he would take his long-delayed trip to Moscow.
The objective of the visit on Monday and Tuesday was not to take Russia’s side; on the contrary, at last month’s G7 meeting in Italy, Modi embraced Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and engaged in bilateral discussions with him. Rather, Modi was seeking to affirm India’s enduring foreign policy independence, while reaping the strategic benefits of closer ties with Russia.
India’s relationship with Russia dates back to 1971, when India was at its most vulnerable. The Pakistani military was attempting to crush the independence movement in then-East Pakistan — now Bangladesh — by any means necessary. Up to 3 million Bangladeshi civilians (mainly Hindus singled out by Pakistan’s Muslim army) were slaughtered, about 200,000 women were coerced into rape camps and about 10 million people fled to India.
The US was more than complicit in the carnage. Far from pushing back against Pakistan’s military dictator, General Yahya Khan, then-US president Richard Nixon’s administration maintained friendly relations with him to advance US interests in Asia.
While Khan’s army carried out the genocide in East Pakistan, Nixon sent then-US national security adviser Henry Kissinger from Pakistan to Beijing on his now-famous secret trip, which led to Nixon’s own visit to China in February 1972.
At a White House meeting, Kissinger credited Khan for the success of his “cloak and dagger” diplomacy with China, saying: “Yahya hasn’t had such fun since the last Hindu massacre.”
On a memorandum from Kissinger regarding the crisis, Nixon wrote: “To all hands: Don’t squeeze Yahya at this time.”
Yet that was not all. In an effort to prevent Bangladesh from achieving independence, Nixon pressed China to open a military front against India. It was Kissinger’s job to goad the Chinese into initiating troop movements toward the Indian border, declassified White House tapes and documents show.
Nixon went so far as to tell Kissinger that India needed a “mass famine.”
Faced with such hostility, then-Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi concluded a friendship treaty with the Kremlin. The pact’s security provisions helped to deter China from opening a front against India when Indian forces eventually intervened to help Bangladesh gain independence in a swift, 13-day operation.
Nixon’s dissatisfaction was obvious: In a show of force aimed at coercing India into limiting its involvement, the US deployed a nuclear-capable naval task force off the southern tip of India. This gunboat diplomacy led India to conduct its first underground nuclear test in 1974; the US responded by imposing technology sanctions on India that remained in place for almost three decades. Meanwhile, the US and China helped Pakistan to build its own nuclear bomb.
Today, India maintains deeper and broader ties with the US than with Russia, but Nixon’s China opening still haunts the bilateral relationship. With its decades-long policy of aiding China’s economic rise, the US not only created the greatest strategic adversary it has ever faced, but also saddled India with a formidable military foe that is aggressively striving for regional hegemony. One manifestation of this is the Sino-Indian military standoff in the Himalayas, which is now in its fifth year.
This is a key motivation behind India’s efforts to strengthen its relationship with Russia, which India believes can counterbalance China. After all, Russia extends across 11 time zones and possesses huge reserves of natural resources, an enormous nuclear arsenal, increasing space prowess and veto power at the UN Security Council.
Moreover, Russia and China are natural competitors, with sharply diverging interests in Central Asia, Northeast Asia and the Arctic, which each country regards as part of its strategic backyard.
Even so, Russia and China have been growing progressively closer in the past few years — and it is largely the US’ fault. This alliance of convenience — which Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) have termed a “no-limits partnership” — threatens not only to accelerate the relative decline of an overstretched US, but also to erode Indian security.
Already, China has leveraged its position as an economic lifeline for Russia to gain access to advanced Russian military technologies, which were previously sold only to India. No country is profiting more from the Ukraine war than China.
Someone must drive a wedge between Russia and China. With the US unwilling to take the lead, it is up to India to convince Moscow not to align itself too closely with Beijing.
Fortunately, this is hardly an unrealistic proposition: Although Russia’s promise to provide North Korea with immediate military assistance in the case of war is not good news, its new defense pact with China’s estranged client does suggest that Putin is willing to chart his own course.
The first step for India must be to try to mediate an end to the Ukraine war. This would allow the US to focus on bolstering security in the Indo-Pacific region, thereby improving Taiwan’s chances of survival.
Brahma Chellaney is a professor emeritus of strategic studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
In the US’ National Security Strategy (NSS) report released last month, US President Donald Trump offered his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The “Trump Corollary,” presented on page 15, is a distinctly aggressive rebranding of the more than 200-year-old foreign policy position. Beyond reasserting the sovereignty of the western hemisphere against foreign intervention, the document centers on energy and strategic assets, and attempts to redraw the map of the geopolitical landscape more broadly. It is clear that Trump no longer sees the western hemisphere as a peaceful backyard, but rather as the frontier of a new Cold War. In particular,
When it became clear that the world was entering a new era with a radical change in the US’ global stance in US President Donald Trump’s second term, many in Taiwan were concerned about what this meant for the nation’s defense against China. Instability and disruption are dangerous. Chaos introduces unknowns. There was a sense that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) might have a point with its tendency not to trust the US. The world order is certainly changing, but concerns about the implications for Taiwan of this disruption left many blind to how the same forces might also weaken
As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) races toward its 2027 modernization goals, most analysts fixate on ship counts, missile ranges and artificial intelligence. Those metrics matter — but they obscure a deeper vulnerability. The true future of the PLA, and by extension Taiwan’s security, might hinge less on hardware than on whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can preserve ideological loyalty inside its own armed forces. Iran’s 1979 revolution demonstrated how even a technologically advanced military can collapse when the social environment surrounding it shifts. That lesson has renewed relevance as fresh unrest shakes Iran today — and it should
As the new year dawns, Taiwan faces a range of external uncertainties that could impact the safety and prosperity of its people and reverberate in its politics. Here are a few key questions that could spill over into Taiwan in the year ahead. WILL THE AI BUBBLE POP? The global AI boom supported Taiwan’s significant economic expansion in 2025. Taiwan’s economy grew over 7 percent and set records for exports, imports, and trade surplus. There is a brewing debate among investors about whether the AI boom will carry forward into 2026. Skeptics warn that AI-led global equity markets are overvalued and overleveraged
RSS