In the past few years, a major rivalry has grown between the US and China. The latest development in the dispute was a US delegation’s visit to Dharamsala, the headquarters of the Tibetan government-in-exile, where they met with the Dalai Lama.
The high-level bipartisan delegation was led by US Representative Michael McCaul, a Republican, and former US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi, a Democrat. Their visit received extra attention because they presented the Dalai Lama with a copy of the Resolve Tibet Act, passed by the US Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support on June 12.
The visit sparked threats and intimidation from China as provisions in the bill mark a major departure from the US’ traditional position on Tibet.
Introduced by McGovern in 2022 as the “Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Conflict Act,” and last year as the “Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act,” the bill seeks to amend certain provisions of the 2002 Tibet Policy Act. Its key objective is to counter disinformation concerning Tibet and the Dalai Lama.
First, the legislation takes a step beyond the previous acts by advocating for Tibetans’ rights to self-determination. It focuses on human rights and the preservation of the unique Tibetan language, identity and culture.
The last time the US advocated for such rights was during the Cold War when the China-US rivalry was at its peak.
Second, Washington has been cautious in declaring its position on the status of Tibet. While the act does not reject that Tibet is a part of China, it states clearly that “the United States Government has never taken the position that Tibet was a part of China since ancient times.”
That statement challenges one of the core arguments of Beijing’s sovereignty and legitimacy claims over Tibet.
Third, one of the important provisions of the act is its rejection of the delimitation of Tibet into the Tibet Autonomous Region. The act instead endorses the Tibetan government-in-exile’s position of greater Tibet, which includes the Tibet Autonomous Region and the traditional regions of Kham and Amdo, which have been turned into autonomous prefectures and counties under the Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan and Sichuan provinces.
In other words, the bill rejects the Chinese colonial definition of the Tibetan area and advocates the traditional definition of Tibet.
Fourth, the act strongly affirms the US Department of State’s responsibility to coordinate with other governments in multilateral efforts toward a negotiated agreement on Tibet. That means that the special coordinator for Tibet would continue to work in the region, unless abolished by a new political guard following the US presidential election.
Last, in 2022, the US Congress passed the Tibet Policy and Support Act, which condemned the Chinese government’s interference in the selection of the next Dalai Lama. It also voiced US support for the Dalai Lama and pledged to counter disinformation related to Tibet, the Dalai Lama and the Dalai Lama’s institution.
The US’ continuous support for the Dalai Lama amid China’s threats signals that the US stands with the Tibetan leader who has been criticized as a separatist by the Chinese government.
The bill, which already passed the US Senate earlier this year, next heads to US President Joe Biden’s desk. During an interview with an Indian journalist, McCaul said that the president would sign the bill.
Dolma Tsering is a postdoctoral researcher at National Yang-Ming Chiao Tung University’s International Center for Cultural Studies.
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