The Kremlin has announced that preparations are being made for Russian President Vladimir Putin to visit North Korea. As Putin chose North Korea as the second country he would visit after retaking power by an overwhelming vote, the close relationship and illegal arms trade between North Korea and Russia can only be expected to intensify.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who recognizes the situation as a golden opportunity that is unlikely to happen again during his time in power, can be expected to try to secure key technologies from Russia to advance the North’s nuclear and missile capabilities before the war in Ukraine ends.
This is why the meeting between the two leaders is attracting attention.
The most fundamental reason Kim wants to secure the core technologies necessary for nuclear advancement is because he firmly believes that the US is the most important country regarding the survival of himself and his regime, not Russia, and that nuclear negotiations with Washington are inevitable. The 27 personal letters that Kim exchanged with then-US president Donald Trump from April 2018 to August 2019 show how earnestly he wishes to improve relations with the US.
However, due to the shocking results of their Hanoi summit, Kim became convinced that the only condition necessary to move the US was not a fancy meeting or an exchange of letters, but advancing the North’s nuclear capabilities. For Kim, it would be a game changer that could enable him to sit at the nuclear disarmament negotiation table as a nuclear weapons state on equal standing with the US.
What is worrisome is that Putin, who has staked his political life on winning the war in Ukraine, is likely to accept Kim’s demands.
The first reason, unlike the provision of actual weapons, is that the sharing or transfer of military technology related to nuclear advancement cannot be easily detected by the international community, so it would be free from criticism and the burden of responsibility. In particular, the neutralization of the UN Security Council sanctions monitoring mechanism against North Korea due to Russia’s veto in March last year provides the optimal environment for such secret transactions.
Second, Putin wants to further escalate the North Korean nuclear crisis to distract the US from the war in Ukraine with the launch of a new intercontinental ballistic missile around the US presidential election.
If North Korea’s demands are accepted and nuclear and missile advancement technologies are transferred, Putin and Russia would not be able to avoid catastrophic repercussions. First, the advancement of Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities would maximize its strategic autonomy, and as a result, Putin’s plan to confront the US through North Korea-Russia solidarity would suffer.
Second, Putin’s plan to bolster solidarity with China would also end in failure, and China-Russia relations would end up in an irreversible state. To date, China has shown solidarity with Russia to counter the US’ hegemonic leadership, but it is maintaining a “strategic distance,” despite Russia’s strong “love call.” China’s ambivalent attitude toward Russia is due to its calculation that it has more to lose than gain if it boards the same boat as Russia, which is directly violating the UN system and international norms through its dangerous and illegal arms trade with the North.
What is of greatest concern is the fundamental change in South Korea’s policy to respond to North Korean nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia.
As a result, the possibility of Pyongyang’s independent nuclear armament becoming a reality is very high, and it is difficult to rule out the possibility that it could lead to nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia, including Japan and Taiwan.
This scenario would be the worst-case scenario for Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), who pursues stability on the Korean Peninsula and the “one China principle,” and all responsibility and blame would fall on Putin and Russia.
For Putin, North Korea’s weapons and ammunition are desperately needed for victory in Ukraine. To counter the US and Western powers, close relations with North Korea would also be necessary. However, what Putin must keep in mind is that there have been many historical cases where victory on the battlefield did not result in victory in war if the means and methods were not just.
Russians would not stand by a leader who is being exploited by Kim’s nuclear game and is driving the country and its people to ruin. The international community would also not forgive a dictator who provided an answer to the final puzzle in completing the North’s advancement of nuclear capabilities.
Jaewook Jung is a professor and dean of International Convergence Studies at Hoseo University, South Korea.
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