On April 19, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) decommissioned the Strategic Support Force (SSF), a unit that originated from the PLA Rocket Force in 2015. The SSF was responsible for space, cyber, and electronic warfare. It will be replaced with three co-equal forces—the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, and Information Support Force (ISF).
However, the ISF appears to be a special project of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), and is the one he is publicly supporting the most.
The elimination of the SSF and the creation of the ISF are part of a broader military reorganization, resulting in the PLA’s new structure of four services — Army, Navy, Air Force and Rocket Force —supported by four forces directly under the supreme Central Military Commission (CMC): the existing Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF), plus the three new forces — the Aerospace Force (ASF), Cyberspace Force (CSF) and Information Support Force (ISF).
Of the three, only the ISF appears to have had a commissioning ceremony. Xi presided over the event and delivered a speech in which he referred to the ISF as “a new strategic branch of the military.” Xi emphasized the importance of building a strong and modernized information support force. The decommissioning of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) suggests that China’s military leadership felt the SSF was not optimized for modern needs. Additionally, it is significant that in his speech,
Xi stressed the need for integration. He urged the ISF to “integrate deeply into the Chinese military’s joint operation system, carry out information support operations in a precise and effective manner, and facilitate military operations in various directions and fields.”
This new integrative approach to military management aligns with the “whole of government” strategy for achieving policy objectives. It also approximates the system already in use by the United States military. The creation of the ISF is closely tied to Xi’s broader goal of modernizing the PLA, as he urged the ISF “to establish a network information system that meets the demands of modern warfare.”
It is important to note that details about the ISF’s exact structure and capabilities remain unclear. China often keeps its military developments secretive. However, the emphasis on “Information Support” indicates a clear shift towards information warfare as a critical element of modern military strategy.
Experts believe the ISF will closely collaborate with the Aerospace Force (ASF) and Cyberspace Force (CSF). The ISF will be responsible for integrating network-centric warfare (NCW), electronic warfare (EW) and information operations (IO), as well as Space and Counterspace Operations.
Moving into the details of contemporary military strategy, it is important to look at NCW, EW and information warfare individually and consider the potential role of the ISF in each.
Network-centric warfare operates on the principle of information superiority, leveraging information technology to military command with ground forces, sensors, shooters and weapons for coordinated, real-time decision-making that enhances combat effectiveness.
It bridges the gap between information gathered by troops and assets on the battlefield and decision-makers who may be in remote locations, fostering shared awareness that enables quicker reactions and faster-paced, more lethal operations.
The ISF is expected to prioritize building and maintaining secure networks, conducting cyber operations (both offensive and defensive), and exploiting enemy networks for intelligence gathering.
Electronic warfare entails the PLA disrupting enemy communications and radars while safeguarding its own. To accomplish these objectives, the ISF could oversee jamming equipment, devise counter-drone tactics, and potentially execute offensive cyberattacks against enemy electronic systems.
Information operations focuses on shaping the perceptions of both adversaries and allies. The ISF might engage in psychological operations (psyops) to demoralize enemy forces, spread misinformation to sow discord, and even hack media outlets to control the narrative.
Space and Counterspace Operations were initially under the purview of the SSF and are now likely to fall within the domain of the ISF. Given the increasing significance of satellites for communication and navigation, the ISF might be assigned the task of safeguarding China’s space assets and potentially disrupting those of adversaries.
However, China will also maintain the Aerospace Force (ASF). Therefore, it remains uncertain which specific space and counterspace operations will be conducted by the ISF and which will remain within the Aerospace Force’s jurisdiction.
However, it also indicates that Beijing is still in a phase of trial and error. Normalizing and evaluating the new structure will take time. Nonetheless, this shift demonstrates the PLA’s commitment to modernization, posing an increased threat to the US, Taiwan and other allies.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiaotong University, studies national defense at the American Military University in West Virginia.
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