In a recent essay, “How Taiwan Lost Trump,” a former adviser to US President Donald Trump, Christian Whiton, accuses Taiwan of diplomatic incompetence — claiming Taipei failed to reach out to Trump, botched trade negotiations and mishandled its defense posture.
Whiton’s narrative overlooks a fundamental truth: Taiwan was never in a position to “win” Trump’s favor in the first place. The playing field was asymmetrical from the outset, dominated by a transactional US president on one side and the looming threat of Chinese coercion on the other.
From the outset of his second term, which began in January, Trump reaffirmed his worldview: Alliances are not based on values, but on leverage. He threatened NATO, insulted key Asian allies and imposed tariffs on everyone from Brazil to Germany. Taiwan was not spared.
Despite its efforts — expanded Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co investment in Arizona, proposed trade frameworks, and the continued purchase of advanced US weapons — Trump slapped a 20 percent tariff on Taiwanese goods last month. Unlike Japan or South Korea, Taiwan lacks formal alliance protections and the economic weight to resist such pressure.
Worse still, the Trump administration quietly canceled Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo’s (顧立雄) visit to Washington and blocked President Willliam Lai’s (賴清德) US transit — reportedly due to Chinese demands during bilateral trade talks. These are not failures of engagement; they are symptoms of a coercive structure in which Taiwan was treated as a bargaining chip rather than a partner.
Whiton’s claim that Lai failed to congratulate Trump soon enough is a red herring. Trump does not reward goodwill — he rewards subservience — and even that rarely guarantees protection.
Critics argue that Taiwan should have moved faster or offered more, but such advice ignores the impossible bind Taipei faced: Resist Trump’s demands and risk retaliation, or comply and invite further escalation.
This is classic bully diplomacy. Concessions encourage more demands, resistance triggers punishment. Trump’s view of foreign policy is zero-sum and dominance-driven. Taiwan’s measured strategy — quiet restraint and cautious engagement — was not weakness. It was a rational attempt to manage an unpredictable superpower while under existential threat from China.
Strategic restraint is not submission. It is survival.
The real story is not how Taiwan lost Trump, but how Trump lost Taiwan. His second-term foreign policy has repeatedly treated Taiwan as expendable — despite Taiwan’s consistent pro-US stance, democratic governance and strategic importance.
Whiton inadvertently exposes this logic by stating that Taiwan “gave nothing” to the US. Taiwan has contributed vastly: from its semiconductor dominance and global supply chain reliability to its frontline position in the contest between democracy and authoritarianism.
Trump, guided by personal loyalty tests and economic transactionality, has praised Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) “strength,” mused about reconsidering Taiwan policy, and prioritized short-term US-China trade objectives over democratic solidarity.
Whiton also argues that Taiwan’s progressive policies — on LGBTQ rights, energy and civil liberties — might have alienated the American “new right.” However, this argument misreads the far right in both countries.
Taiwan’s embrace of liberal democracy, including same-sex marriage and environmental protections, is not a political stunt. It is an expression of national identity grounded in human dignity and constitutional principles. These are not weaknesses — they are the moral assets that distinguish Taiwan from its authoritarian neighbors.
Moreover, the American new right does not shape foreign alliances based on values — it rewards power and loyalty. Trump’s admiration for autocrats like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Russian President Vladimir Putin is not based on shared social conservatism — it is about strongman rule. Taiwan’s progressivism did not push Trump away. It simply never factored into his transactional worldview.
Reducing Taiwan’s diplomatic challenges to culture-war grievances distorts the real issue.
Taiwan should never apologize for being a modern, open society. Nor should its value be judged through the ideological lens of another country’s internal divisions.
Taiwan must pursue a more self-reliant, diversified diplomacy. That means engaging not only the US president and their advisers, but also US Congress, the Pentagon, governors and state-level actors. Taiwan must deepen bipartisan ties and reject the temptation of personalistic foreign policy strategies.
Some voices in Taiwan have expressed blind support for Trump, interpreting his anti-China rhetoric as proof of pro-Taiwan sentiment. His record tells another story: tariffs, canceled meetings, reduced visibility and subordination of Taiwan to broader deals with Beijing.
Betting Taiwan’s future on the temperament of one man is not strategy — it is surrender.
Most troubling in Whiton’s argument is the attempt to shift blame onto Taiwan. This rhetorical move echoes the logic of authoritarian powers: blaming smaller states for not appeasing larger ones effectively enough.
Taiwan did not “lose” Trump. Rather, Trump’s foreign policy was never designed to support smaller democracies unless they were useful in his immediate political calculus.
Simon Tang is an adjunct professor at California State University, Fullerton, who lectures on international relations.
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