Denmark’s “one China” policy more and more resembles Beijing’s “one China” principle. At least, this is how things appear.
In recent interactions with the Danish state, such as applying for residency permits, a Taiwanese’s nationality would be listed as “China.”
That designation occurs for a Taiwanese student coming to Denmark or a Danish citizen arriving in Denmark with, for example, their Taiwanese partner. Details of this were published on Sunday in an article in the Danish daily Berlingske written by Alexander Sjoberg and Tobias Reinwald.
The pretext for this new practice is that Denmark does not recognize Taiwan as a state under international law, the article says. The interesting point is that this appears to be a recent change.
Denmark’s new practice of registering Taiwanese as Chinese illustrates how exposed and vulnerable Taiwan is to the seemingly mundane policies of other countries. These procedures are implemented even though they risk following a Chinese “salami-slicing” tactic whereby the nuanced “one China” policies of different nations slowly line up with Beijing’s “one China” principle.
The key difference between the Chinese “principle” and nation’s “policies” is that the former says that Taiwan is a part of China, while that is not the case for the policies implemented by countries around the world.
Much like Denmark, Norway registers Taiwanese as Chinese. In Norway, Taiwanese still have all the formal rights they previously enjoyed, and then the question is whether nationality is just an emotional want. The argument might go that Taiwanese might be listed as “Chinese,” but they are still treated as Taiwanese. In Denmark as well, Taiwanese appear to keep all of the rights that they previously had.
However, upholding formal rights does not excuse a policy that undermines the self-determination for the 24 million people of Taiwan.
Denmark’s actual “one China” policy simply states that it recognizes China and not Taiwan. Therefore, Denmark does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Nevertheless, it maintains and develops economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. The current interpretation of this policy is that Taiwan is not considered a part of China.
By registering Taiwanese as Chinese, this previous interpretation might have changed. It is not only civil registrations that reveal Denmark’s casual mindset.
The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site says that in China, Denmark maintains representation in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai and Taipei.
Denmark is known internationally for its ethical foreign policies and strong stances on human rights. This can now be questioned. The risk is that other EU countries would adopt similar policies and create long-term problems for Taiwan and its 24 million citizens to freely determine their future. Taiwan cannot fight China alone.
We live in a time in history when everyone needs to take sides on questions of democracy and human rights. Denmark is strong in its opposition to Russia as demonstrated by impressive support for Ukraine, but are its values equally robust when it comes to China?
Michael Danielsen is chairman of Taiwan Corner.
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