Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) despotic regime has attempted to intimidate and subjugate pretty much every neighboring nation in the region. I suppose it goes back to the archaic “Middle Kingdom” syndrome, in which every country throughout East Asia was supposed to extend fealty to Beijing, if not politically, at least economically. Yet a funny thing happened along the way. China’s neighbors began growing weary of Beijing’s ham-handed policies, and are now pushing back.
One remarkable development in Northeast Asia has been the recent rapprochement between Tokyo and Seoul. For over half a century, South Korea retained an enduring resentment over Imperial Japan’s admittedly abysmal treatment of the territory during the Imperial era. The welcome change has been brought about both by the new bilateral diplomacy of the two northeast Asian neighbors, as well as the harsh and clumsy treatment of both by Beijing.
But it goes farther than that. From my perspective, Xi’s policies have driven most of China’s neighbors into a tacit alliance aimed at blunting Chinese bullying of all of them. One striking example of this has been the newfound willingness of the Philippines to extend warmer relations with Tokyo. The brutal memory of Japanese treatment of the former American colony during World War Two has been eclipsed by Manila’s growing anxiety over Chinese territorial aggrandizement. Beijing has asserted control over the entire South China Sea, despite a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration that dismissed these assertions.
China has recently leveraged its growing naval power to block Manila’s access to its rightful territories. The backstory involves access to rich fishing grounds in the South China Sea contested by China, Vietnam and the Philippines. Given a longstanding treaty arrangement between Washington and Manila, America has commitments to come to the aid of the Philippines should a third party pose a threat there. Thus, the stakes could not be higher. The worst-case scenario would find Washington coming to Manila’s assistance in the case of a shooting war with Beijing, posing a significant risk of a regional conflagration drawing in most of the neighboring countries.
Japan too is shifting its focus to recognize Chinese aggression against its neighbors as a direct threat to Tokyo’s own interests. The fact that China has asserted expansive — and unsubstantiated — claims to some of Tokyo’s territories has been remarkable, given Tokyo’s defense ties to Washington.
It is unclear to me who, if anyone, in Beijing’s inner circles of power has the chutzpah to take on basically all of its neighboring countries with its groundless territorial claims. This flies in the face of international law and treaty arrangements between Washington and many of the key players. But apparently Xi seems to think he can get away with all this. One wonders if anyone in his inner circle is willing to speak truth to power and warn Xi of the stark risks he is taking on.
The core problem with tyrants is that they — consciously or not — discourage advice that flies in the face of their ambitions. After a while, the isolated leader can come to believe everyone agrees with him, since no one speaks up. A tight inner circle that discourages alternative views is also part of the problem. But one of the risks that autocrats take on by discouraging frank exchanges on major issues is that they become increasingly isolated from on-the-ground reality or the potential consequences of their actions.
We have seen a similar situation in Russia, where Russian President Vladimir Putin has embroiled himself in a brutal war with Ukraine that has generated hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries, to say nothing of the terrible destruction to both Ukraine and even parts of Russia. I seriously doubt Putin encourages frank advice from those who have access to his ear. Meanwhile, Moscow’s circle of friends is currently limited to North Korea and China. Pretty much the rest of the region is to one extent or another either opposed — or at a minimum neutral — on the question of these matters of regional and national security.
Both Putin and Xi may be hoping America’s presidential elections in November will bring Donald Trump back into power, with the prospect of a friendlier audience in Washington. These upcoming elections will indeed have major implications for Taiwan and its security. It is true that former US president Donald Trump shows little interest in the nuances of international politics, is easily flattered, and appears to only rarely seek outside counsel. Trump also seems incurious about matters of national defense, surrounds himself with sycophants, and ignores unwelcome advice. This is particularly dangerous when it leads to a willful disregard of unpleasant facts.
The Biden presidency, in contrast, has been more outspoken than past leaders in publicly stating America’s intention to commit its diplomacy and military power to the defense of Taipei. A second term under Joe Biden would ensure continuity in our longstanding close relations with Taiwan. Even if a Republican majority in Congress emerges, it has historically been solidly supportive of Taiwan. This is in no small measure because Taipei has long gone out of its way to nurture close relations on both sides of the aisle there. Should Trump — despite his multiple legal problems — regain the White House next year, he will find himself constrained by Congressional voices insisting on continued close relations with Taiwan.
Taiwan’s recent election of Vice President William Lai (賴清德) to follow in the footsteps of President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) this spring suggests a great deal of continuity in Taipei’s foreign policy. True, Lai will have to deal with a fractious legislature that may thwart or impede policy decisions. It is a plus that the president-elect chose as his vice-presidential partner Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴), seasoned as she is from recently serving as Taiwan’s informal representative in Washington. Most significantly, it is my sense that the Taiwan people remain committed to their democratic and open society, and will support all prudent measures to defend their sovereignty, should it be threatened.
In sum, much is currently in flux as we enter the Year of the Dragon. Taiwan’s incoming team will need to bolster public support for its policies, in the face of a fractured Legislative Yuan and sectoral tensions up and down the island.
None of what I have said here suggests this will be easy. But — barring a Trump victory this fall AND a very different Congressional balance — America will view Taiwan as a solid friend of the United States. The plucky island state can expect both moral and material support from Washington for our longstanding friend and partner in East Asia. Friends of Taipei in the United States as well as throughout East Asia will be paying close attention to these critical questions.
Ambassador Stephen M. Young (ret.) lived in Kaohsiung as a boy over 50 years ago, and served in AIT four times: as a young consular officer (1981-’82), as a language student (1989-’90), as Deputy Director (1998-2001) and as Director (2006-’9). He visits often and writes regularly about Taiwan matters. Young was also US Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan and Consul General to Hong Kong during his 33-year career as a foreign service officer. He has a BA from Wesleyan University and a PhD from the University of Chicago.
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