Indonesian Minister of Defense Prabowo Subianto’s rise to the presidency — as a preliminary quick count pending official validation by the Indonesian Election Commission shows — marks a significant juncture in diplomatic ties between Indonesia and Taiwan.
This is noteworthy given his anticipated divergence from Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s foreign policy approach. Prabowo is recognized for his adaptive stance in international engagements, a departure from Widodo’s steadfast strategy. This is exemplified by Widodo’s infrequent participation in UN sessions, where he is typically represented by Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi.
A shift is anticipated with Prabowo’s administration. Known as “Mr Worldwide,” he is expected to adopt a distinct and potentially capricious approach to Indonesia’s diplomatic endeavors. Drawing upon Chatham House Asia-Pacific program director Ben Bland’s insights, Prabowo is likely to introduce a novel and unpredictable dimension to Indonesian diplomacy, characterized by vigor and spontaneity.
Under Widodo, diplomacy has been relatively static, characterized by a predominantly reactive approach. When it comes to Taiwan, Indonesia has consistently adhered to the “one China” policy.
Prabowo recently initiated a campaign to promote food self-sufficiency in Indonesia, promising constituents a surplus in two to three years. This initiative aims to reduce reliance on global superpowers such as the US and the EU, as well as East Asian regional powers like South Korea, Japan and China. Should Prabowo remain steadfast in his objectives, there exists a possibility for a more dynamic interpretation of the “one China” policy.
Under a Prabowo leadership, there might be an opportune moment for such advancements, the author said in his article “Time to boost Indonesia-Taiwan” in the Taipei Times.
Prabowo has, on numerous instances, censured major nations when talking about his foreign policy outlook, asserting that these countries have double standards when it comes to Indonesia. He underscores a future where the country has emancipated itself of dependence on these nations and talks about the evolution of global dynamics.
In a scenario where Indonesia achieves autonomy and its nickel market reduces its reliance on China, there is a chance that Indonesia might regard Taiwan as a distinct and sovereign entity. This would increase Taiwan’s political recognition and legal acknowledgement on the global stage.
However, such conjecture is contingent upon Prabowo’s diplomatic approach. The trajectory of Indonesia-Taiwan development hinges on Prabowo’s adaptability in engaging with China, potentially offering constructive proposals concerning Taiwan’s status. Given his background as a former military officer, Prabowo should approach diplomacy with strategic foresight. The evolving landscape of Indonesia-Taiwan relations is likely to yield mutual benefits and foster growth across diverse sectors.
Taiwan has played a pivotal role in facilitating the electoral processes in Indonesia, as there are many Indonesian expatriates in Taiwan who participate in voting exercises. This underscores the reciprocal advantages of deepening ties between the two nations.
The author posits that under Prabowo, there exists a chance that Indonesia reassesses its stance on Taiwan. This would be contingent upon a comprehensive evaluation encompassing political, economic and military considerations.
M. Syaprin Zahidi is a senior lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of Muhammadiyah Malang and is a doctoral student at Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government at the Universiti Utara Malaysia.
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