Over the past decade, China has doubled the range and coverage of its land-based missiles, now extended to include all US bases in the Pacific, including Guam. This escalation of capabilities is attributed to the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), officially recognized as the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Rocket Force. The PLARF can be described as a clandestine Chinese military unit that poses a significant threat to the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region. Operating as a dedicated rocket force, the PLARF plays a pivotal role in China’s defense and security planning, overseeing both nuclear and conventional strategic missile forces. Notably, the PLA is the only army with a specialized rocket force functioning as a unique armed service. The PLARF has its own Rocket Force Command College, Rocket Force University of Engineering and Rocket Force Non-commissioned Officer School.
The presence of a dedicated rocket force enables China to concentrate on advancing missile technologies, encompassing guidance systems, propulsion and precision capabilities. This technological progress not only enhances China’s defense capabilities, but also strategically positions the country in potential scenarios, such as playing a pivotal role in a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan. The PLARF holds a special place in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) preferences and is at the forefront of the modernization efforts within the PLA.
The rate at which the PLARF is expanding is staggering. Between 1980 and 2000, only four new brigades were developed. By 2010, as many as 11 new brigades were established, each equipped with a growing arsenal of weapons. As of today, the PLARF comprises 39 brigades and nine bases, including six operational bases and three support bases. The six operational bases (numbered 61 to 66) are assigned to different geographic theater commands in China and hold a mix of nuclear and conventional missiles. Three support bases (numbered 67 to 69) handle specific tasks such as managing the central nuclear stockpile, engineering and infrastructure, advanced personnel training and missile testing.
Within the operational bases, Base 61 is designated to cover eastern and parts of southeastern China. Base 62 is tasked with overseeing the remaining portions of southeastern China. Base 63 is specifically dedicated to inland southern China. Base 64 is allocated for the northwest and north-central regions of China. Base 65 is responsible for eastern and northeastern China, while Base 66 is designated to cover central China.
That China has a dedicated rocket force, unlike the US, does not automatically imply that the US is weak or necessarily puts the PLA at an advantage. The US just uses a different system, whereby each of the services — air force, army and navy — operates its own wide range of tactical and strategic missiles, according to the unique mission of each service.
These missile systems are then integrated into the broader defense planning of the US military as a whole.
Last year, the head of the PLARF was ousted for corruption, along with several other high-ranking members of the PLARF and those working in procurement. Corruption is rampant throughout the PLA, but in any military, corruption is generally worse in procurement. Officials handling funds and making purchases on behalf of the military are in a position to skim money or accept kickbacks for the award of contracts to friends and family. In the case of the rocket force, given its cutting-edge technology and integral role in Xi’s battle plans, it receives priority in defense budget allocation, resulting in a significant influx of cash.
It would be a mistake to believe that the corruption uncovered in the PLARF suggests that the branch is ineffective or less of a threat. If anything, that the leadership has been replaced would suggest that the new leaders are Xi loyalists and could fit better into Xi’s overall strategic planning. Replacing the PLARF leadership could be part of his larger plan of preparing for an invasion of Taiwan. Many experts believe that he has set 2027 to be ready for the invasion, while the US Department of Defense believes the PRC is targeting a 2030 deadline. Regardless of the exact date, the PLARF would play a strategic role in that planning.
By 2028, the PLARF is projected to possess more than 1,000 ballistic missile launchers, including at least 507 capable of carrying nuclear payloads, 342 to 432 conventional launchers and 252 with dual capabilities. Furthermore, there would be 320 solid-fuel fixed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, with 30 liquid-fuel fixed ICBM silos under construction. It is important to note that these figures exclude launchers deployed by the PLA Air Force and the PLA Navy.
In the event of a Taiwan invasion, the PLARF would execute precise conventional and nuclear strikes using its arsenal of missiles, including 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles, 100 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and about 600 ground-launched cruise missiles, all with ranges of 1,000km to 1,500km.
These missiles would be targeted at critical defense assets of the Republic of China Air Force.
The PLARF possesses the capability to launch missiles from mobile, ground-based units, utilizing a strategy known as shoot-and-scoot tactics. This involves moving the launcher after firing to evade counterfire.
The PLA continues to modernize and upgrade its technology and capabilities across all dimensions and military services, from space to cyber, and naval, air and ground forces. The PLARF plays a crucial role in potential invasion scenarios and is a significant aspect of this overall modernization effort.
Xi must know that moving too soon could result in disastrous failure.
By closely monitoring the PLARF’s development, it becomes easier to gauge when the PRC might consider itself prepared for war.
Simultaneously, it remains essential for the US, Taiwan, and other allies to enhance their rocket defense capabilities, complicating Xi’s strategic planning.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiaotong University, studies national defense at the American Military University in West Virginia.
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