Two days after Taiwanese ignored Beijing’s threats and elected William Lai (賴清德) as president, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in an article published in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Qiushi journal on Monday last week urged the party to do a better job winning the hearts of Taiwanese.
Xi outlined a strategy for the country’s “united front” tactics, saying that China must “develop and strengthen the patriotic, pro-unification forces in Taiwan, oppose the separatist acts of Taiwan independence and promote the complete reunification of the motherland.” He urged the CCP to redouble efforts to “stoke national awareness and patriotism” among Taiwanese.
However, Chinese authorities obviously failed to win over or pressure Taiwanese into voting for pro-China candidates on Jan. 13. The usual carrot-and-stick tactics — including military drills, and diplomatic and economic coercion — did not work.
Lai’s victory was not only a blunt rejection of China’s coercive tactics and unprecedented electoral interference, it was also a rejection of the so-called “1992 consensus,” the “one China principle” and the “one country, two systems” model.
On Monday last week, the US Pew Research Center published a survey which showed that more than two-thirds of Taiwanese see themselves as primarily Taiwanese, with only 3 percent calling themselves primarily Chinese, 1 percentage point lower than in a 2022 survey. Although many in Taiwan welcome trade with China, few support closer political ties, the survey showed.
A post-election poll conducted by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation echoed this trend, with more than 76 percent identifying as solely Taiwanese, while only 7 percent considered themselves to be Chinese.
A majority supported Lai’s objection to the “1992 consensus,” while 69 percent said they were not worried that his election victory would cause China to expedite any potential invasion plans.
The sophistry of calling the election a choice between “war and peace” failed.
Xi and the CCP should learn the lesson. Intimidation campaigns backfire, as they stir Taiwanese resentment toward the authoritarian power in Beijing, bolster Taiwanese identity and solidify support for a democratic, free and de facto independent Taiwan.
China should face the reality that a cross-strait conflict would be a costly catastrophe, especially amid its domestic economic decline and internal political turmoil. A Beijing-initiated change of the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait would lead to international sanctions and rejection, which would be the opposite of its plans to resume international engagements and de-escalate tensions with the US.
A Center for Strategic and International Studies report this week said that a poll of US and Taiwanese experts bolstered the view that China is likely incapable of launching a military invasion of Taiwan in the next five years, although there was still concern over its ability to isolate the nation.
Lai has expressed goodwill, vowing to maintain the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait and working toward resuming cross-strait dialogue.
If Xi really wants to win the hearts and minds of Taiwanese, he should hold back on the “wolf warrior” tactics and restart friendly communications with Taipei.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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