In May 2021, the Economist published an article saying that the Taiwan Strait was “the most dangerous place on Earth.” Events since then have shown that regardless of the apparent level of geopolitical tension in an area, conflict might break out elsewhere with little warning. Just as Ukraine was settling in for another long winter of war and observers were saying that Taiwan was next, violence erupted in the Middle East.
Events that have been building for years now suggest that the West Philippine Sea — the Philippine government’s official designation of the parts of the South China Sea that it claims as its own — has become another geopolitical powder keg.
Earlier this month, Philippine Ambassador to the US Jose Manuel Romualdez told Nikkei Asia in an interview that the South China Sea “is the flashpoint, not Taiwan,” and that skirmishes between Philippine and Chinese vessels there could spark a major conflict at any time.
Is the South China Sea now more dangerous than the Taiwan Strait?
Tensions have been growing over the past year, with Chinese vessels using a “military-grade” laser, water cannons and rammings to threaten and provoke Philippine vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal (Renai Shoal, 仁愛暗沙) in the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands, 南沙群島); and near Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island, 黃岩島) in the Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha Islands, 中沙群島).
China has warned the Philippines to proceed with caution and to “make a rational choice,” while Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) has said that Beijing would respond resolutely if Manila “colludes with ill-intentioned external forces,” while accusing it of changing its policy stance.
Manila has, indeed, changed its policy stance, with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr signaling not just a readjustment, but a “paradigm shift” in its approach to China.
Whatever there is to say about the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is at the very least consistent in its policy, even if it is unreasonable and lacks a legitimate basis in international law.
Marcos has little choice but to change tack significantly amid the CCP’s intransigence — it claims to want to cooperate and reach a mutual agreement, but this presumes that agreement consists of the other party accepting its position.
Taiwan’s relationship with China differs from
Manila-Beijing ties. However, there are some striking similarities, such as the struggle to establish negotiations with its larger counterpart, and the coercive methods forced upon it by the larger nation.
The solution to get around this CCP bullying involves bolstering relations with like-minded partners, something that Marcos has been working on since taking office in June last year and which President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has been doing since 2016. If this is what Wang means when he talks of “colluding with ill-intentioned external forces,” so be it.
It is important for as many voices in the international community as possible to call the CCP out and to rein in its behavior. This could include statements of mutual support and participation in joint maritime and air patrols in a multilateral show of force. The Philippines last month conducted such patrols with the US and other countries might join future missions.
The similarities are so striking that it is strange that they are not highlighted more often — indeed, at all — by politicians in Taiwan, especially during campaigning for next month’s presidential election in which the candidates’ approaches to cross-strait relations are more keenly watched than usual.
Given the nature of the problem, the allied consensus on the solution and that, like Taiwan and Japan, the Philippines is in the first island chain, a joint approach by these nations’ leaders might be in order.
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