Under Taiwan’s electoral system, the number of legislator-at-large seats is proportional to the number of party votes a party receives if they exceed the threshold of 5 percent of all party votes cast. Each party is entitled to submit a ranked list of 34 nominees for 34 at-large seats in the 113-seat legislature.
All of the major parties have announced their legislator-at-large lists.
The makeup of the Legislative Yuan is becoming clearer and the future seems anything but promising.
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) might secure 10 to 13 seats. Only two of its nominees have legislative experience, with the rest from local factions, or powerful entrepreneurial or political families. Some of the nominees have already shown that they would contest mayor or county commissioner elections in 2026.
Chang Chia-chun (張嘉郡), daughter of former Yunlin County commissioner Chang Jung-wei (張榮味), is a prime example. The more than century-old KMT is showing its true colors and how degraded it has become. If these politicians secure a seat in the Legislative Yuan, they would represent the interests of their factions or families, not the nation. What matters to them is the 2026 local elections.
What is worse is that former Kaohsiung mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) topped the KMT’s list. It is almost certain that he will be in the Legislative Yuan.
During Han’s previous time as a lawmaker, he had a record of remaining silent for four question-and-answer sessions in a row. He was really good at slacking off.
When he became Kaohsiung mayor, his performance was far from satisfactory. Then he abandoned his mayoral duties to run for president.
After his failed bid to win the presidency, Kaohsiung residents overwhelmingly voted to recall him as mayor.
What Han wants is a title rather than a position to work for the people, but he is likely to return to the Legislative Yuan.
If the pan-blue and white camps secure more than half of the seats, Han might even become legislative speaker. If so, he would be able to do whatever he wants, because legislators-at-large cannot be removed by the people.
Meanwhile, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) might secure eight to 10 seats, with it targeting “more than 10.”
Among its top six nominees, five used to be in other political parties. One of the controversial nominees not only changed parties, but has alleged links to organized crime.
The TPP might be seeking to bring parties together, but it might have allowed in influence from criminal elements, which would be unacceptable.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) might win 10 to 13 at-large seats, but it might fall below 10 due to its focus on government administration.
Its No. 6 to 11 nominees were recommended by DPP factions, which might seem like a problem, but the top five have shown exceptional professionalism in dealing with youth rights, civil defense, environmental issues, renewable energy and the rights of “new immigrants.”
These are urgent issues, so the DPP should be applauded.
The Taiwan Statebuilding Party and the New Power Party might not secure any legislator-at-large seats, as they might not reach the party-vote threshold, but they have professionals and experts on their lists.
Regrettably, it seems inevitable that Han is to become a legislator. Pan-green supporters should work together to secure as many seats as possible to at least prevent him from becoming speaker.
Yeh Chi-cheng is an administrative officer at a university.
Translated by Emma Liu
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